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“AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM” AND THE 
SUPREME COURT’S MARRIAGE CASES* 
David B. Cruz** 
          This Article addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, the two cases in 
the October 2012 Term that took up issues of marriage rights of same-
sex couples. After Part I of the Article provides a brief Introduction, 
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry. It summarizes 
the litigation; teases out divergent views of the relevance of federalism 
for the Court’s standing ruling in the case; identifies the problematic 
constitutional underpinnings of the Perry dissenters’ views of federal 
court standing, which rely on an unjustified constitutional privileging of 
initiative lawmaking; and explains why Perry is likely to have but 
limited impact on the Supreme Court’s Article III standing doctrine. 
Part III then summarizes the Windsor litigation; defends what should 
have been the self-evident conclusion—though denied by Justice Scalia 
in his dissent—that the majority opinion is based on equal protection 
(even if it perhaps also rests on substantive due process protection of 
“liberty”) and in so doing unpacks its treatment of federalism—
something Scalia derided as “amorphous”—to show how the majority’s 
treatment of states’ predominant historical role in marriage regulation 
fits within an evidentiary framework the Court used to help establish 
the impropriety of the purpose of the Defense of Marriage Act; and 
explores some potential ramifications of the Windsor decision for 
challenges to state refusals to recognize same-sex couples’ marriages 
from other states and to state refusals to allow same-sex couples to 
marry within their territory. 
 
 * Copyright © David B. Cruz 2014. 
 ** Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I thank 
Nancy Marcus and Doug NeJaime for thoughtful comments on the Article, John Korevec for 
valuable research assistance, and the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their 
professional editorial work. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2013, one decade to the day after the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided its landmark “gay rights” case 
Lawrence v. Texas,1 the Court decided a pair of cases concerning 
whether the Constitution guarantees same-sex couples rights to civil 
marriages equal to those of different-sex couples. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry2 presented equal protection and substantive due process 
challenges to California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), which amended 
the state constitution to strip same-sex couples of the right to marry 
that the state supreme court had previously held the constitution 
guaranteed. United States v. Windsor3 presented an equal protection 
challenge to section 3 of the federal so-called Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA),4 which defines marriage for virtually all federal law as 
limited to male-female couples,5 thus excluding same-sex couples 
lawfully married under state, Indian tribal, or foreign law from 
federal legal rights and responsibilities conditioned upon marriage. 
In Perry,6 the governor and the attorney general of California 
had refused to defend Prop 8,7 which was instead defended by the 
individual sponsors or “proponents” of the initiative. When 
 
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law unconstitutionally 
deprived the men who challenged the law of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). By way of disclosure, I was a member of the board of directors 
during much of and an elected general counsel for the ACLU throughout the Windsor litigation, 
and the ACLU represented Edie Windsor in her challenge to DOMA section 3, although I did not 
help with that litigation. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (2006)). 
 5. Section 3 of DOMA defines “marriage” for most federal law purposes to “mean[ ] only a 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ [to] 
refer[ ] only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Id. § 3. 
 6. I depart here from the convention of referring to cases by the first (nongovernmental) 
party named in the caption to honor Kris Perry, along with her now wife Sandy Stier, and their 
coplaintiffs Jeff Zarillo and Paul Katami, also now married, whose bravery (and perhaps 
incaution) in litigating against California’s Proposition 8 led to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
decision in Perry clearing the way for same-sex couples to resume marrying in the state. I do not 
see any need to honor Dennis Hollingsworth, one of the official proponents of Proposition 8 who 
qualified that odious measure for the ballot and subsequently doggedly tried to ensure its 
discrimination would continue. 
 7. Bob Egelko, Same-Sex Marriage Fuels Debate over Path to Change, SFGATE (Sept. 8, 
2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Same-sex-marriage-fuels-debate-over-path 
-to-change-4797401.php#page-2. 
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Proposition 8 was held unconstitutional following a bench trial,8 the 
state defendants refused to appeal, leaving the proponents to attempt 
to do so themselves. When the U.S. Supreme Court granted their 
petition for a writ of certiorari, it directed the parties not simply to 
address whether Proposition 8 was unconstitutional but also to brief 
whether the proponents had standing.9 After arguments in March 
2013, a majority of the Court ruled that the measure’s proponents 
lacked Article III standing,10 dismissed the appeal,11 and ultimately 
left the district court injunction against Proposition 8 intact,12 
clearing the way for same-sex couples to resume marrying in 
California. 
Windsor also presented standing issues, because after Edie 
Windsor filed the lawsuit, Attorney General Eric Holder and 
President Barack Obama concluded that section 3 of DOMA was 
unconstitutional and therefore refused to defend it.13 The House 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) then intervened to defend 
it.14 Although BLAG lost on summary judgment, where the district 
judge vindicated the administration’s position,15 the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) did not comply with the judgment but instead sought 
to appeal the case, as did BLAG.16 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with the district court that DOMA’s section 3 was 
unconstitutional,17 and DOJ and BLAG sought Supreme Court 
review. Answering a question it had directed the parties to address,18 
the Supreme Court ruled in Windsor that there was a proper case or 
 
 8. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786 (2012) (“In addition to the question 
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: 
Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case.”). 
 10. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Perry v. Brown, 725 F.3d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 13. Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 14. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
 15. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 16. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 17. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012) (“In addition to the question 
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: 
Whether the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional 
deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case.”). 
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controversy before it, despite the administration’s agreement with the 
plaintiff’s constitutional interpretation.19 On the merits, the Court 
held that section 3 of DOMA violated the Constitution’s equal 
protection guarantee as applied to same-sex couples validly married 
under state law.20 
Although Justice Scalia joined the majority in Perry holding that 
Proposition 8’s sponsors lacked standing to appeal the trial court 
ruling striking it down,21 he did not agree with the majority in 
Windsor.22 Dissenting from the decision even to reach the merits, as 
well as from the Court’s conclusion that on the merits section 3 of 
DOMA was unconstitutional,23 he had nothing but disdain for the 
majority opinion.24 After criticizing much of the majority’s 
discussion of federalism, he leveled this (no pun intended) blistering 
indictment at the Windsor majority opinion: 
Some might conclude that this loaf [i.e., the opinion] could 
have used a while longer in the oven. But that would be 
wrong; it is already overcooked. The most expert care in 
preparation cannot redeem a bad recipe. The sum of all the 
Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid 
(maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-
due-process grounds, and maybe with some amorphous 
federalism component playing a role) because it is 
motivated by a “bare . . . desire to harm” couples in same-
 
 19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (“In this case the United States retains a stake sufficient to 
support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before this Court.”); id. at 2688 (“For 
these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are met here; and, as a consequence, the 
Court need not decide whether BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court's 
ruling and its affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authority.”). 
 20. See id. at 2693 (concluding that DOMA section 3 “violates basic due process and equal 
protection principles applicable to the Federal Government”). Part III.B infra discusses at length 
the equal protection grounding of the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision. 
 21. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2013). 
 22. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 23. See id. (“We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power 
under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation.”). 
 24. Rather than close his opinion with the customary “I respectfully dissent,” e.g., id. at 2720 
(Alito, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia ended his Windsor dissent with the more blunt “I dissent.” Id. 
at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even that was prefaced by the recriminatory assertion that “[w]e 
owed both [sides in this controversy] better.” Id. See also id. at 2698 (labeling Court’s reasoning 
as “jaw-dropping”); id. at 2701 (“The majority’s discussion of the requirements of Article III 
bears no resemblance to our jurisprudence.”); id. at 2705 (“There are many remarkable things 
about the majority’s merits holding. The first is how rootless and shifting its justifications are.”). 
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sex marriages.25 
This Article takes up Justice Scalia’s concern for the allegedly 
“amorphous” role of federalism in the Windsor opinion. First, 
though, Part II turns to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry. It 
summarizes the litigation, teases out divergent views of federalism’s 
relevance of federalism for the Court’s standing ruling, identifies the 
problematic constitutional underpinnings of the Perry dissenters’ 
view, and touches on Perry’s limited impact for the Supreme Court’s 
Article III standing doctrine. Part III summarizes the Windsor 
litigation, defends what should have been the self-evident conclusion 
that the Supreme Court’s Windsor opinion is based on equal 
protection, and unpacks its treatment of federalism. Part III also 
explores some potential ramifications of the decision for challenges 
to states’ refusals to recognize same-sex marriages from other states 
or to allow same-sex couples to marry within their territory. 
II.  FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY 
Although the role of federalism in Hollingsworth v. Perry is 
more “amorphous” or inchoate than in United States v. Windsor, the 
Justices’ opinions in Perry might nonetheless be usefully addressed 
through a federalism lens. The majority opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts perhaps could be read to say we serve federalism by keeping 
federal courts out of disputes lacking properly aggrieved parties, as 
doing so keeps federal courts in a limited role that does not call for 
them broadly to superintend state governance.26 The ideologically 
mixed Perry dissenters invoke federalism, suggesting the majority 
disserves federalism by disparaging states’ initiative processes.27 The 
dissenters’ position presupposes that the Constitution values 
initiative mechanisms, or at least a state’s freedom to choose one. 
But as Hans Linde and others have argued, the initiative process is 
constitutionally quite problematic.28 So, even if it is not 
constitutionally forbidden, we certainly should not see the initiative 
as constitutionally guaranteed (say in the same way the independence 
of state legislatures from federal “commandeering” is held to be 
 
 25. Id. at 2707. 
 26. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
 27. See infra notes 98–112 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
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guaranteed),29 and so denying federal court standing to initiative 
sponsors seeking to defend discriminatory measures should not be 
seen as a harm to the constitutional order. 
Section A of this part summarizes the Perry litigation up to and 
including in the Supreme Court. Section B identifies and analyzes a 
disagreement among the Justices about how the Court should apply 
principles of federalism to state initiative processes. Section C 
recounts some of the constitutional concerns about state initiatives, 
especially ones like Proposition 8 that target minority populations for 
unfavorable treatment, concerns which undermine the dissent’s view 
on this issue. Section D then explains why the Court’s Article III 
standing holding is likely to have only minor effects on the cases that 
can come before the federal courts. Perry thus may ultimately be 
more significant for the large numbers of people it allows to be 
married than for its doctrinal holding. 
A.  The Perry Litigation 
In May of 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled in In re 
Marriage Cases that the state constitution’s equal protection 
guarantee and its fundamental right to marry required that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. The court held that the exclusion failed such scrutiny 
and was therefore unconstitutional.30 From June 2008 through 
November 4, 2008, an estimated 18,000 same-sex couples were 
married in the state.31 On November 4, 2008, election day, the voters 
of the state were asked to approve Proposition 8, an initiative that 
would amend the California Constitution to strip away same-sex 
couples’ right to marry. And the voters did so, supporting Prop 8 by 
a vote of approximately 52 percent to 48 percent.32 
The next day, a number of persons filed suit in state court,33 
arguing that Prop 8 was impermissibly adopted via the initiative 
process because it was not a mere “amendment” to the state 
 
 29. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 30. 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008). 
 31. David B. Cruz, Californians Enshrine Discrimination in Constitution, CRUZLINES.ORG 
(Nov. 5, 2008), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2008/11/californians-enshrine-discrimination-in 
.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 65–66 (Cal. 2009). 
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constitution, but a more profound “revision,” requiring approval by 
the legislature.34 Proposition 8’s proponents or official sponsors 
defended their measure in court because the governor thought the 
state supreme court should invalidate it35 and the attorney general 
affirmatively argued that it was unconstitutional.36 After oral 
arguments in which former U.S. Solicitor General Kenneth Starr 
argued for the measure’s defenders, the California Supreme Court 
rejected the revision argument and upheld Prop 8.37 Justice Carlos 
Moreno was the sole dissenter.38 
Four days before the California Supreme Court rejected that last 
state-law challenge to Proposition 8,39 two same-sex couples, Kris 
Perry and Sandy Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeff Zarillo, filed suit in 
federal court.40 The plaintiffs were represented by the political odd 
couple of David Boies and Ted Olson, the attorneys who had 
represented rival presidential candidates before the Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore in 2000.41 They argued that Prop 8 violated same-sex 
couples’ federal constitutional right to equal protection and 
fundamental right to marry.42 Boies and Olson were hoping to fast-
track the litigation up to the U.S. Supreme Court,43 but Chief Judge 
 
 34. Id. at 60–62, 68, 88. 
 35. Maura Dolan, Justices Will Hear Prop. 8 Challenges: State Supreme Court Agrees to 
Take Up the Lawsuits Next Spring but Refuses to Stay a Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/20/local/me-prop8-supreme-court20. 
 36. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 63, 116 (presenting the attorney general’s argument that state 
constitutional amendments that abrogate fundamental rights must pass a “compelling interest” 
test that Proposition 8 fails). 
 37. Id. at 48; David Edwards & Stephen P. Webster, Arguing for Prop. 8, Ken Starr Says 
Any Right Can Be Taken, RAW STORY (Mar. 5, 2009), http://rawstory.com/news/2008 
/Ken_Starr_argues_for_Prop_8_0305.html. 
 38. David B. Cruz, Equality’s Centrality: Proposition 8 and the California Constitution, 19 
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 45, 48 (2010) (recounting the background to the Proposition 8 
litigation through the California Supreme Court decision rejecting the revision argument). 
 39. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 48. 
 40. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), 2009 WL 1490740, at *1. 
 41. Ross Todd, Marriage Brokers, AM. LAW. (Mar. 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
news/Documents/GibsonDunnMarriageBrokers-AmLaw-3-11.pdf. 
 42. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 43. See, e.g., Prop 8 on Trial, EQUAL. CAL., http://www.eqca.org/site/pp.asp?b= 
5716101&c=kuLRJ9MRKrH (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (noting for July 2009 that “Counsel for 
plaintiffs and the intervenor-defendants (Prop 8's proponents) say the case instead should be 
resolved quickly in the district court based on legal briefs without evidentiary findings” rather 
than have a factual trial); Margaret Talbot, Closing Time, NEW YORKER (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/ 2010/06/closing-time.html (noting during the 
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Vaughn Walker of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California insisted that the parties have a full trial.44 
The parties included the City and County of San Francisco, 
which intervened as a plaintiff challenging Prop 8, as well as the 
initiative’s proponents, the private individuals who had qualified the 
measure for the ballot.45 The proponents intervened as defendants 
seeking to uphold the law at least in part because neither the 
governor nor the attorney general of California was going to defend 
Prop 8 in the litigation.46 At the close of a trial in which the 
plaintiffs’ witnesses dramatically outnumbered47 and were more 
 
Perry trial that “Boies and Olson hope the Perry case will be appealed all the way up to the 
Supreme Court”); Todd supra note 41 (“When Boies and Olson filed suit in San Francisco federal 
district court on May 22, 2009, they thought a ruling on their motion for preliminary injunction 
would create grounds for a quick appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Neither expected the case to go to trial.”). 
 44. Scott Shafer, Prop 8 Judge Vaughn Walker: Courts’ Change on Same-Sex Marriage Was 
‘Utterly Unimaginable,’ KQED NEWS FIX (June 12, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix 
/2013/06/11/vaughn-walker (noting that “Walker ch[o]se to hold a trial with witnesses, rather 
than just take briefs and make a ruling”). 
 45. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928–29. 
 46. See id. at 928. 
 47. Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Judge Wants a Discussion of ‘Choice’ in Sexual Orientation, L.A. 
TIMES, June 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/15/local/la-me-prop8-trial-20100615 
(“Opponents of Proposition 8 called 16 witnesses and supporters two.”). “Plaintiffs presented 
eight lay witnesses, including the four plaintiffs, and nine expert witnesses.” Perry, 704 F. Supp. 
2d at 932. “Historian Nancy Cott testified about the public institution of marriage and the state's 
interest in recognizing and regulating marriages.” Id. at 933. “Psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau 
testified that couples benefit both physically and economically when they are married. . . . 
Economist Lee Badgett provided evidence that same-sex couples would benefit economically if 
they were able to marry and that same-sex marriage would have no adverse effect on the 
institution of marriage or on opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 934. “Psychologist Gregory Herek . . . . 
conclu[ded] that the vast majority of people are consistent in their sexual orientation.” Id. at  
934–35. “Social epidemiologist Ilan Meyer testified about the harm gays and lesbians have 
experienced because of Proposition 8. . . . Psychologist Michael Lamb testified that all available 
evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted 
as children raised by heterosexual parents and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether 
an adult is a good parent.” Id. at 935. “San Francisco economist Edmund Egan testified that states 
receive greater economic benefits from marriage than from domestic partnerships.” Id. at 936. 
“Historian George Chauncey testified about a direct relationship between the Proposition 8 
campaign and initiative campaigns from the 1970s targeting gays and lesbians; . . . the 
advertisements relied on a cultural understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to 
children. [¶] This understanding, Chauncey observed, is an artifact of the discrimination gays and 
lesbians faced in the United States in the twentieth century.” Id. at 937. “Political scientist Gary 
Segura . . . . conclu[ded] that gays and lesbians lack political power.” Id. In contrast, “[d]espite 
the multitude of benefits identified by [think tank founder David] Blankenhorn that would flow to 
the state, to gays and lesbians and to American ideals were California to recognize same-sex 
marriage, Blankenhorn testified that the state should not recognize same-sex marriage. 
Blankenhorn reasoned that the benefits of same-sex marriage are not valuable enough because 
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credible than the defense’s two witnesses,48 Judge Walker held that 
Prop 8 unconstitutionally violated same-sex couples’ rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause and fundamental constitutional right to 
marry.49 
The state defendants declined to appeal, but the proponents of 
Prop 8 sought to do so, even though it was unclear to various 
observers (and the plaintiffs challenging Prop 8) whether the 
proponents had standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.50 
Because the standing issue was also unclear to the court of appeals, 
that court certified a question to the California Supreme Court as to 
the proponents’ authority to defend Prop 8 under state law.51 
Eventually, the state supreme court held that state law authorized the 
proponents to assert the state’s interests and file appeals in defense of 
Prop 8 when the state defendants refused to do so.52 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that this was good 
 
same-sex marriage could conceivably weaken marriage as an institution.” Id. at 934 
(identification at 933). And proponent’s proffered expert “[p]olitical scientist Kenneth Miller 
disagreed with Segura's conclusion that gays and lesbians lack political power, pointing to some 
successes on the state and national level and increased public support for gays and lesbians, but 
agreed that popular initiatives can easily tap into a strain of antiminority sentiment and that at 
least some voters supported Proposition 8 because of anti-gay sentiment.” Id. at 937. 
 48. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (“[T]he court finds that each of plaintiffs’ proffered 
experts offered credible opinion testimony on the subjects identified.”); id. at 946–47 (“The court 
now determines that [proponents’ proffered expert David] Blankenhorn’s testimony constitutes 
inadmissible opinion testimony that should be given essentially no weight. . . . None of 
Blankenhorn’s opinions is reliable.”); id. at 950 (“Blankenhorn’s opinions are not supported by 
reliable evidence or methodology and Blankenhorn failed to consider evidence contrary to his 
view in presenting his testimony. The court therefore finds the opinions of Blankenhorn to be 
unreliable and entitled to essentially no weight.”); id. at 952 (“[T]he court finds that [proponents’ 
proffered expert Kenneth P.] Miller’s opinions on gay and lesbian political power are entitled to 
little weight and only to the extent they are amply supported by reliable evidence.”). See also id. 
at 937 (“Proponent Hak-Shing William Tam testified about his role in the Proposition 8 
campaign. . . . Tam testified that he is the secretary of the America Return to God Prayer 
Movement, which operates the website ‘1man1woman.net.’ 1man1woman.net encouraged voters 
to support Proposition 8 on grounds that homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest 
children, and because Proposition 8 will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands.”). 
 49. Id. at 991, 993–94, 1002–03. 
 50. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Do the Prop 8 Proponents Have Standing to Appeal?, 
CRUZLINES.ORG (Aug. 13, 2010), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2010/08/do-prop-8-proponents 
-have-standing-to.html. 
 51. See David B. Cruz, California Supreme Court to Hear Prop 8 Case, Again, 
CRUZLINES.ORG (Feb. 16, 2011), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2011/02/california-supreme 
-court-to-hear-prop-8.html. 
 52. David B. Cruz, CA Supreme Court’s Disappointing Standing Decision, CRUZLINES.ORG 
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/search?q=ca+supreme+court%27s+disappointing 
+standing+decision. 
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enough to give the proponents standing in federal court, but that Prop 
8 was unconstitutional, although based on California-specific 
grounds narrower than Judge Walker’s ruling relied on.53 
The proponents then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review 
that decision, and the Court agreed to do so on the same day it agreed 
to hear United States v. Windsor.54 In granting review in Perry, the 
Supreme Court also provided that “[i]n addition to the question 
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue 
the following question: Whether petitioners have standing under 
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case.”55 The Court heard 
arguments in March 2013, and three months later by a five-to-four 
vote it dismissed the proponents’ appeal, vacated the judgment of the 
court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court with instruction 
to dismiss the proponents’ appeal from the trial court ruling 
invalidating Prop 8.56 
The primary problems for the Supreme Court majority were that 
the proponents had no concrete personal injury from the decision 
holding Prop 8 unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement and 
that they were not state officials who might properly assert the state’s 
interests in defense of the law in federal court.57 For decades, the 
Court has interpreted Article III of the Constitution to impose certain 
requirements for someone to have standing to invoke the federal 
judicial power.58 Among those is the requirement that a plaintiff or 
appellant have suffered a personal injury that is concrete and 
particularized, not an abstract ideological grievance.59 The couples 
who filed suit in federal court to challenge Prop 8 had such an injury, 
as the measure compelled the state to deny them marriage licenses 
and the rights that would have accompanied being married.60 But 
 
 53. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 54. David B. Cruz, Supreme Court to Hear Challenges to Prop 8 and DOMA Section 3, 
CRUZLINES.ORG (Dec. 7, 2012), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2012/12/supreme-court-to-hear 
-challenges-to.html. 
 55. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
 56. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658, 2668 (2013). 
 57. Id. at 2662, 2665–66. 
 58. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 560, 573–77. 
 60. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). California law 
did offer same-sex couples and couples one member of whom was at least sixty-two years of age 
the option of entering into a registered “domestic partnership,” which provided the state-
controlled rights of marriage to couples who enter one, see, e.g., id. at 994, though that would not 
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when the trial court ruled in their favor and entered a permanent 
injunction, the proponents of the measure were not comparably 
harmed. They strongly favored the law they had championed, 
believed it constitutional, and wished to see it enforced.61 But those 
are ideological concerns, not Article III injuries under the Court’s 
case law. 
The proponents’ only alternative route to standing would have 
been to wrap themselves in the mantle of the state’s authority. The 
litigants on both sides did not doubt that a state has Article III 
standing to defend its laws and is sufficiently injured by federal court 
rulings holding them unconstitutional that it could appeal such 
decisions in federal court.62 The problem for the Supreme Court in 
Perry, however, was that the Justices in the majority did not view the 
proponents as the state, agents of the state, or the people of the 
state.63 In arguing that they had standing the proponents,64 like the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,65 had relied on the California 
Supreme Court decision66 holding that California law authorized 
initiative sponsors in their position to assert the state’s interests in 
defense of their initiative and to take appeals from decisions ruling it 
unconstitutional. For the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, however, this was insufficient.67 In the majority’s eyes, the 
proponents “hold no office and have always participated in this 
litigation solely as private parties.”68 Besides holding no office, the 
 
generally qualify them for benefits that other states or the federal government provide only to 
married couples. 
 61. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (mentioning that the Ninth 
Circuit held that proponents had standing to appeal). 
 62. Brief of Petitioners at 12, 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.  
12-144) 2013 WL 457384; Brief in Opposition at 12, Hollingsworth v. Perry 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144). 
 63. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. Although the litigation most commonly referred to “the state’s 
interests,” this is really shorthand for the interests of the people of the state. Cf. Perry v. Brown, 
671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is for the State of California to decide who may assert its 
interests in litigation, and we respect its decision by holding that Proposition 8's proponents have 
standing to bring this appeal on behalf of the State. We therefore conclude that, through the 
proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal 
courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power.”). 
 64. Brief of Petitioners, at 12, 15–16, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 
12-144), 2013 WL 457384. 
 65. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 66. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Cal. 2011). 
 67. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 68. Id. at 2665. 
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proponents lacked “the most basic features of an agency 
relationship.”69 The proponents “answer to no one; they decide for 
themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how to 
make them. Unlike California’s attorney general, they are not elected 
at regular intervals—or elected at all. No provision provides for their 
removal.”70 
B.  The Justices’ Disparate Views of Federalism: State Law and 
Federal Standing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion opened with 
recognition that the underlying substantive issue in the case is 
currently subject to political contestation: “The public is currently 
engaged in an active political debate over whether same-sex couples 
should be allowed to marry.”71 From a federalism perspective, this 
might counsel in favor of allowing federal appellate courts to reverse 
the trial court decision and to uphold California’s adoption of 
Proposition 8. Instead, separation of powers trumped the democratic 
process concern, and the Court held that Proposition 8’s sponsors 
lacked Article III standing to appeal in order to litigate its 
constitutionality: “Federal courts have authority under the 
Constitution to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in 
the course of deciding an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”72 The Court 
characterized the policymaking concern behind its standing doctrine 
in terms of separation of powers: “It ensures that we act as judges, 
and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected 
representatives.”73 But this policymaking concern could also be 
thought of in terms of federalism; after all, the “elected 
representatives” who are largely responsible for regulating marriage 
in our constitutional order are state legislators, not members of 
Congress.74 
 
 69. Id. at 2666. 
 70. Id. at 2666–67 (internal citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 2659. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Of course, such reasoning would not be expressly supported by current standing 
doctrine, where the Court has said that the standing limitation derived from Article III “is built on 
a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 
(1984). 
The statement in the main text is of course a bit of an oversimplification. Congress could 
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The Perry majority recounted the Ninth Circuit’s standing 
analysis, which had relied on the California Supreme Court’s answer 
to the Ninth Circuit panel’s certified question regarding the 
proponents’ authority under state law.75 California, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reasoned, “has standing to defend the constitutionality of its 
[laws],” and states have the “prerogative, as independent sovereigns, 
to decide for themselves who may assert their interests.”76 The Ninth 
Circuit thought that “[a]ll a federal court need determine is that the 
state has suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing and that the 
party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is authorized by 
the state to represent its interest in remedying that harm.”77 But the 
majority in Perry rejected the view that a state is free to authorize 
whomever it wants to represent its interests and thereby create 
federal standing.78 
To repeat, the Court spoke of standing in separation of powers 
terms: “The doctrine of standing, we recently explained, ‘serves to 
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of 
the political branches.’”79 The Court referred to “this ‘overriding and 
time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its 
proper constitutional sphere . . . .’”80 But a federal court’s—even the 
Supreme Court’s—“proper constitutional sphere” respects both 
horizontal separation of powers and vertical separation, known as 
federalism. 
The Court recognized that California law, constitutional and 
statutory, gave the proponents “a ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’ 
role in the initiative process”—“but only when it comes to the 
 
exercise its plenary power over the District of Columbia, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, to 
prescribe eligibility criteria for marriage within the District. Indian tribes also prescribe eligibility 
criteria for marriages, and some tribes have allowed same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., David 
B. Cruz, Getting Sex “Right”: Heteronormativity and Biologism in Trans and Intersex Marriage 
Litigation and Scholarship, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 203, 203–04 n.1 (2010) (discussing 
the Coquille Tribe); Steven Gardner, Suquamish Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, KITSAP 
SUN (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2011/aug/01/suquamish-tribe-approves 
-same-sex-marriage/. 
 75. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 76. Id. (quoting Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1070, 1071 (2012) and Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)). 
 77. Id. at 2664 (quoting Perry, 671 F.3d at 1072). 
 78. Id. at 2667. 
 79. Id. at 2661 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)). 
 80. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)). 
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process of enacting the law.”81 Under the California Supreme Court’s 
authoritative construction of state law, the proponents had “no role—
special or otherwise—in the enforcement of Proposition 8.”82 This 
meant that they had no “personal stake” in defending Prop 8’s 
enforcement that was not shared by California voters at large. Their 
complaint that the lower federal courts had enjoined Prop 8 was 
therefore a mere generalized grievance insufficient to confer federal 
standing,83 even though the state was content to have the proponents 
represent its interests. 
The majority agreed that “a State must be able to designate 
agents to represent it in federal court,” and that “state law may 
provide for [certain] officials to speak for the State in federal 
court.”84 Yet the Supreme Court refused to view the proponents of 
Proposition 8 as “agents of the people” of California.85 The majority 
opinion in Perry did not see the proponents as substantive or formal 
agents of the state.86 The California Supreme Court did not describe 
the proponents as agents.87 Moreover, the proponents “answer to no 
one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what arguments to 
make and how to make them.88 Unlike California’s attorney general, 
they are not elected at regular intervals—or elected at all.89 No 
provision provides for their removal.”90 As one amicus explained, 
“the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment for an 
unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and 
to whatever extent they choose to defend it.”91 The proponents, who 
never took any oath of office, had no fiduciary obligation to the 
 
 81. Id. at 2662 (quoting Reply Brief at 5 (quoting Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1126, 
1142, 1160 (2011))). 
 82. Id. at 2663. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2664 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 2666. 
 86. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed, Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-initiatives 
-20130628 (agreeing that the proponents of Prop. 8 lacked standing and suggesting that states 
appoint a special state attorney when other officials refuse to defend an initiative). 
 87. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2667. 
 91. Id at 2667 (quoting Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144)). 
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people of California.92 This was not purely a formalistic distinction 
devoid of potential consequence; as the majority in Perry explained, 
the proponents were accordingly “free to pursue a purely ideological 
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to take 
cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or 
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”93 Their litigation 
decisions and arguments thus might differ from those of someone 
facing more accountability constraints. 
The Justices in the majority rejected the dissent’s suggestion that 
by denying federal standing to the proponents of Prop 8 they were 
“disrespect[ing]” or “disparag[ing]” the reasons the California 
Supreme Court relied upon in authoritatively construing state law to 
give the proponents authority to defend the proposition.94 The 
majority was at pains not to “question California’s sovereign right to 
maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to 
defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III does 
not apply.”95 But “no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a 
private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized 
grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.”96 In 
conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “We have never before 
upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality 
of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline 
to do so for the first time here.”97 
As just suggested, the Perry dissenters, including both 
conservative and more liberal Justices,98 saw things very differently 
from the majority. After opening by lavishing unwarranted praise on 
the California Supreme Court opinion responding to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals,99 the dissent charged that the majority 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2667. 
 97. Id. at 2668. 
 98. Justice Kennedy authored the dissent in Perry and was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, 
and Sotomayor. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. (asserting that the “state-law issues have been addressed in a meticulous and 
unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court of California”). I described many of that opinion’s 
shortcomings on my blog. See David B. Cruz, CA Supreme Court’s Disappointing Standing 
Decision, CRUZLINES.ORG, (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:55 PM), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2011/11 
/ca-supreme-courts-disappointing.html (concluding that the state Supreme Court “does not even 
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opinion’s “reasoning does not take into account the fundamental 
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in 
California.”100 And the dissenters worried not only about California 
but also about the “implications for the 26 other States that use an 
initiative or popular referendum system and which, like California, 
may choose to have initiative proponents stand in for the State when 
public officials decline to defend an initiative in litigation.”101 
The Perry dissenters complained that “[t]here is no basis for this 
Court to set aside the California Supreme Court’s determination of 
state law.”102 That phrasing implies that, in the dissenters’ view, the 
majority had told California that its law was not what the state 
supreme court interpreted it to mean. But the Perry majority did 
nothing of the sort. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, even 
assuming California law is as the state high court ruled, that is 
insufficient to satisfy the standing requirements the Court has 
interpreted Article III to impose.103 
If this language about “setting aside” an authoritative state law 
interpretation is dismissed as merely infelicitous, the dissent’s core 
complaint was that the Perry majority wrongly refused to interpret 
Article III to allow a state to do what the majority believed California 
had attempted to do here: grant certain private parties the state’s 
authority to defend a law, even in federal court, but not the authority 
to enforce it. To prevent elected officials such as the governor and 
the attorney general of a state like California from having a “de facto 
veto” over state law adopted through the initiative process,104 the 
dissenters believed that “California finds it necessary to vest the 
responsibility and right to defend a voter-approved initiative in the 
initiative’s proponents when the State Executive declines to do 
 
pretend to try to parse the meaning of the provisions of law on which it claims it is basing its 
decision”). 
 100. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2670. 
 103. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (“[S]tanding in a federal court is a question of federal law, 
not state law. And no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have 
standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the 
contrary.”). 
 104. Cruz, supra note 99 (explaining why it is incorrect, at least in the posture of cases such 
as Perry, to believe that “veto” or “nullification” of Proposition 8 was really at issue). 
AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM  9/25/2014 4:43 PM 
410 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:393 
 
so.”105 In the dissenters’ view, the majority’s refusal “to allow a 
State’s authorized representatives to defend the outcome of a 
democratic election,”106 here Prop 8, “disrespects and disparages 
both the political process in California and the well-stated opinion of 
the California Supreme Court in this case.”107 
The dissenters believed the majority interpreted Article III to 
deny states the latitude they required to craft initiatives that aligned 
with citizens’ goals regardless of what elected representatives might 
conclude about the constitutionality of such desires.108 The dissenters 
reasoned that through California’s choice (discerned or imposed by 
the state supreme court109) to let private sponsors of initiatives 
defend their measures in court, the state “define[d] itself as a 
sovereign.”110Article III ought therefore to be interpreted to allow 
states such choices. It is this vision of federalism that animated the 
Perry dissenters.111 Thus, for them, “Article III does not require 
California, when deciding who may appear in court to defend an 
initiative on its behalf, to comply with . . . this Court’s view of how a 
State should make its laws or structure its government.”112 
 
 105. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 2674. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., id. at 2675 (“In the end, what the Court fails to grasp or accept is the basic 
premise of the initiative process. And it is this. The essence of democracy is that the right to make 
law rests in the people and flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides 
first in the people without need of a grant from the government.”). 
 109. See Cruz, supra note 99 (“[T]he [state supreme] court is not interpreting but clearly 
adding to the words of the state constitution and the Election Code.”). 
 110. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. See e.g., id. (“In California and the 26 other States that permit initiatives and popular 
referendums, the people have exercised their own inherent sovereign right to govern themselves. 
The Court today frustrates that choice . . . .”); id. at 2668 (insisting that “the State Supreme 
Court’s definition of proponents’ powers is binding on this Court”); id. at 2669 (“It is for 
California, not this Court, to determine whether and to what extent the Elections Code provisions 
are instructive and relevant in determining the authority of proponents to assert the State’s interest 
in postenactment judicial proceedings. And it is likewise not for this Court to say that a State 
must determine the substance and meaning of its laws by statute, or by judicial decision, or by a 
combination of the two. That, too, is for the State to decide.” (internal citations omitted)). 
Although the dissent charges that the majority “fails to abide by precedent and misapplies basic 
principles of justiciability,” id. at 2675, even some people who believe that initiative sponsors 
ought to have standing have nonetheless concluded that they do not given current California law 
and Article III standing doctrine. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 86 (“The Supreme Court's 
decision to dismiss a challenge to Proposition 8 on Wednesday followed well-established law 
with regard to standing in federal court.”). 
 112. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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The majority, however, does not say that Article III or anything 
else in the Constitution prevents states from vesting such authority in 
proponents of initiative measures. It simply says that, without more, 
a state’s decision to grant such authority does not vest those 
proponents with federal standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to defend such measures against constitutional 
challenge. The majority and dissenting Justices’ disagreement over 
the propriety of this holding stems from their apparent disagreement 
over the nature of federalism dictated by the Constitution, and the 
place of initiative measures in that scheme of federalism. 
C.  The Constitutional Problematics of Direct Democracy and 
Proposition 8 
If the Constitution guaranteed states the prerogative to adopt 
initiative and referendum lawmaking, and if federal court standing 
for the sponsors of such measures to defend them, including by 
appealing adverse trial court rulings when elected officials refuse to 
do so, were necessary to make such lawmaking effective, then the 
Perry dissenters would have a more powerful argument that the 
majority’s denial of standing disserved “Our Federalism.”113 If those 
preconditions were met, then the majority’s ruling arguably would 
have deprived states of the constitutionally protected power to 
empower initiative sponsors to appeal federal court rulings holding 
their measures unconstitutional. Yet both of these argumentative 
preconditions are deeply questionable. 
I have previously detailed reasons that California’s initiative 
power should not be understood to have been vitiated by the denial 
of Article III standing for sponsors to defend their initiatives.114 
Briefly: As the same-sex couple plaintiffs in Perry noted and the 
California Supreme Court conceded, “invalidation of Proposition 8 
in the underlying federal litigation did not result from any action or 
inaction by the Governor or Attorney General but from a decision by 
the federal district court after a contested trial.”115 Clearly “there is 
 
 113. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (discussing the origins of the 
term “Our Federalism,” and how this term conceptualizes a national government that will act “in 
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States”). 
 114. See generally Cruz, supra note 99 (arguing that a proponent’s lack of standing in federal 
court will not undermine California’s initiative process). 
 115. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 n.18 (Cal. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
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no risk of ‘effective nullification’” in state courts,116 where 
California can grant proposition sponsors standing to defend. And in 
federal court, a case would only be litigated if the plaintiffs have an 
adequate injury for standing, in which case the proponents of the 
measure would not need to have standing on their own to intervene 
as defendants, after which the measure would receive “a ‘competent 
and spirited defense,’ and a federal judicial decision invalidating the 
measure therefore cannot be pejoratively labeled a state officer 
‘nullification.’”117 It is therefore unlikely that federal standing to 
appeal is necessary for the second precondition of the Perry 
dissenters’ reasoning to be satisfied. 
Nor is the first precondition likely satisfied. It is doubtful that 
the Constitution guarantees states the prerogative to adopt initiative 
and referendum lawmaking, at least in the context of a measure 
targeting lesbigay people for disfavorable treatment.118 As former 
state supreme court Justice Hans Linde argued two decades ago,119 
such measures may well violate the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee 
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”120 
Republican government in the states was distinguished by the 
Clause’s drafters from direct democracy.121 And certain usages of 
direct democracy are problematic for the same kinds of reasons that 
motivated the Guarantee Clause’s framers. “A statewide initiative 
may be a legitimate process for enacting a gross receipts tax and not 
for raising social barriers between groups of citizens.”122 Linde’s 
study of the founding generation’s understanding of republicanism 
led him to conclude that it “depended on deliberation by 
representative institutions not only for rational public policies; it also 
 
omitted). 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See David B. Cruz, Repealing Rights: Proposition 8, Perry, and Crawford 
Contextualized, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 241 (2013) (defending conclusion that 
“Prop 8 takes the right to marry the person of one’s choice away from lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
persons but not from heterosexually identified persons”). 
 119. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The 
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993). 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 121. Linde, supra note 119, at 22. 
 122. Id. at 31. 
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was the essential safeguard of civil and religious rights.”123 
Capture of state power by religious majorities to impose their 
standards on dissidents was a particular fear of that generation,124 
and so, Linde argues, a core concern of the Guarantee Clause. Where 
group passions about morality animate public policy and invite a 
state’s “citizens to choose sides between the righteous and the 
sinners, between the homosexual minority and the heterosexual 
majority,”125 republican government has failed. For 
the design of republican government, embodied in the 
Constitution eighty years before the Fourteenth 
Amendment, would not allow such policies to be put to a 
statewide plebiscite upon initiative petitions that bypass 
deliberation by elected legislators and governors (and, when 
amending the state constitution, by the courts). Rather, such 
deliberations were the only guarantee safeguarding 
minorities against unmediated swings of majority 
passions.126 
Linde was writing in the context of Oregon’s proposed Measure 
9, which lumped “homosexuality” together with “pedophilia, sadism 
[and] masochism”; prohibited the State from legislating against 
sexual orientation discrimination or otherwise “recogniz[ing]” the 
category “homosexuality”; forbade the government to “promote, 
encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or 
masochism”; and directed public schools in particular to “assist in 
setting a standard for Oregon’s youth that recognizes homosexuality, 
pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, 
and perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged and 
avoided.”127 California’s Proposition 8, though less inflammatory in 
tone, raises very similar structural concerns. 
Prop 8 reflects a social “dividing practice,”128 discriminates with 
respect to an important societal institution, and selectively overrides 
the state’s equality and fundamental rights guarantees, all without 
 
 123. Id. at 33. 
 124. See id. at 35. 
 125. Id. at 36. 
 126. Id. at 37. 
 127. Id. at 36 n.71. 
 128. For a brief discussion of the provenance and significance of “dividing practices,” see 
David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003 n.30 (2002). 
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having been tempered by the representative legislative process. Prop 
8 seeks to draw a stark line between the people in same-sex couples 
and those in different-sex couples, and thus largely between lesbigay 
and heterosexually identified persons, with the latter treated as more 
valuable or significant.129 This dividing practice is a prime example 
of the kind of factionalism Linde was addressing. Prop 8 
discriminates with respect to marriage, which is a distinctively 
important societal institution.130 This heightens the harm the measure 
wrought—harms which were never addressed and assessed through 
legislative deliberation because Prop 8 was proposed via the 
initiative process. Prop 8 also sought to override the California 
Supreme Court’s determinations that “all adult Californians enjoy a 
fundamental right to marry the person of their choice” and “that 
sexual orientation is a suspect classification under the California 
Constitution, such that government action discriminating on the basis 
of sexual orientation, including the exclusion of same–sex couples 
from civil marriage, is likewise subject to strict scrutiny.”131 Prop 8, 
by “requiring discrimination against a group defined by a suspect 
classification with respect to a fundamental right, thus violat[ed] the 
foundational guarantee of equal citizenship in the California 
 
 129. Michael Dorf has explained why exclusionary marriage laws such as California’s 
Proposition 8 are reasonably regarded as expressing a second-class status for lesbigay persons. 
See generally Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2011). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing “the 
understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory 
benefits”); id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing marriage as “an institution so central 
to the lives of so many”); id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing “[t]he family” as “an 
ancient and universal human institution”); id. at 2720 (speculating that Congress “viewed 
marriage as a valuable institution to be fostered and . . . viewed married couples as comprising a 
unique type of economic unit that merits special regulatory treatment”); cf. In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “the substantive right of two adults who share a 
loving relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their own— 
and, if the couple chooses, to raise children within that family—constitutes a vitally important 
attribute of the fundamental interest in liberty and personal autonomy that the California 
Constitution secures to all persons for the benefit of both the individual and society”); id. at 424 
(“[P]ast California decisions have described marriage as the most socially productive and 
individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–55 (Mass. 2003) 
(describing civil marriage as “a social institution of the highest importance” and observing that 
“[t]he benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every 
aspect of life and death.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 131. Cruz, supra note 38, at 47. 
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Constitution” as that document is best understood.132 The rampant, 
unfiltered factionalism at work in Prop 8 thus selectively stripped 
away some of the most fundamental guarantees of fairness 
previously offered by the California Constitution. This, too, shows 
that Linde’s concerns about Oregon’s Measure 9 are also raised as 
strongly by California’s Proposition 8. 
Consequently, states might never have the option, let alone a 
constitutionally protected prerogative, to adopt a measure such as 
Proposition 8 via an initiative process, bypassing the legislature, and, 
even if permissible, the Constitution should not be thought to place 
any special value on a state’s doing so. My argument is not that 
measures that violate constitutional equal protection principles 
should therefore be thought also to violate the Guarantee Clause. 
Rather, direct democracy is sufficiently constitutionally 
problematic—at least when it comes to minority-targeting measures 
like Prop 8, regardless of whether such measures in fact violate equal 
protection—that it should not be regarded as a weighty criticism if a 
constitutional doctrine does not zealously protect state power to use 
an unfettered initiative process to strip minorities of rights. The fact 
that the Perry majority rejected the Prop 8 proponents’ and the 
dissenting Justices’ invitations to take Article III standing doctrine 
down the path of empowering states to place appellate defense of 
discriminatory initiative measures in the hands of private persons 
lacking any meaningful accountability133 or role constraints should 
carry little weight as an indictment of the majority’s reasoning. 
“Our Federalism” ought not be understood as prizing a state’s 
ability to treat minorities the way the Perry dissenters would have 
privileged it. The majority’s rejection of the dissent’s federalism-
based arguments shows, at a minimum, that such putative state 
prerogatives rank low in a hierarchy of constitutional values. 
Maintaining a federal judiciary with a limited role and insisting that a 
state’s litigation agents truly represent the people of the state clearly 
trumped the dissenters’ more robust view of states’ rights. It is of 
 
 132. Id. at 47–48. 
 133. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (“[P]etitioners answer to no 
one. . . . Unlike California’s attorney general, they are not elected”); but see id. at 2672 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“[The initiative] proponents, too, can have their authority terminated or their 
initiative overridden by a subsequent ballot measure.”). 
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course true that the Perry majority’s analysis limits the standing of 
all personally uninjured parties in whom a state might seek to vest 
defense of any initiative, not just initiatives targeting minorities in 
ways similar to California’s Proposition 8.134 But this seems a 
modest price to pay for a federal standing doctrine that would not 
aggrandize those who would turn state law direct democracy 
provisions against politically vulnerable minorities.135 
As a predictive matter, it should be noted that the Supreme 
Court seems unlikely any time soon to hold that initiatives and 
referenda are categorically unconstitutional, although some scholars 
have taken that position.136 Indeed, in April 2014 in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,137 the Court reversed a case 
from Michigan where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
unconstitutional138 a state initiative that amended Michigan’s 
constitution to bar affirmative action or any consideration of “on the 
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin” in public 
colleges and universities, “public employment, public education, or 
public contracting.”139 Although Schuette presented the Court only 
with an equal protection challenge to Michigan’s law,140 Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion did more broadly suggest that “[t]here is 
no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court's 
precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit 
this policy determination to the voters.”141 The current Court displays 
marked hostility to race-based government action even when 
designed to include historically excluded minorities.142 And in 1996, 
 
 134. See generally id. (majority opinion). 
 135. See Linde, supra note 119, at 32–38 (explaining that direct democracy initiatives that 
target minorities subjecting them to the swings of majority passions threaten republicanism). 
 136. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Republic for Which It 
Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 
1059 (1996) (arguing “that the Guarantee Clause establishes a per se prohibition against state 
initiatives”). 
 137. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 138. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 
2012), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 1623. 
 139. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 140. See id. at 1629 (“The Court in this case must determine whether an amendment to the 
Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the 
Equal Protection Clause ….”). 
 141. Id. at 1638. 
 142. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (invalidating municipal rejection of 
promotion test that had not been validated for the firefighter positions at issue after test produced 
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with a less conservative bench of Justices,143 the Court went out of 
its way to avoid relying on cases striking down initiative measures 
that operated to the particular detriment of racial minorities.144 Given 
all this, this Court is unlikely to rule broadly that use of the initiative 
mechanism violates the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
That does not necessarily mean that it would hold that the 
Constitution affirmatively protects or values states’ authority to make 
law by initiative, or that the Court would not invalidate particular 
anti-lesbigay ballot measures as unconstitutional, perhaps on the 
ground that they are rooted in animus against lesbigay persons. 
D.  Future Defense of Prop 8 and Other State Initiatives 
It is not apparent that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perry will 
have a major effect on standing determinations in other cases, for it 
shuts courthouse doors in strikingly limited circumstances. First, 
because Perry was rooted in Article III of the Constitution, it only 
applies to litigation in federal courts; state courts are free to adopt 
less restrictive standing rules and allow initiative proponents 
standing to defend and take appeals in defense of the initiatives they 
sponsored.145 Second, if you have an actually, nonideologically 
injured party seeking to appeal, federal litigation remains open.146 If 
 
significant disparate impact on minorities); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating race-based pupil-assignment schemes designed to avoid 
extremes of racial isolation in schools in district at issue). 
 143. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y 
TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (concluding that by 
the end of June 2010, the Roberts Court “became the most conservative one in living memory, 
based on an analysis of four sets of political science data”). 
 144. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (affirming on a “different” rationale a state 
court decision that had invalidated an anti-lesbigay state constitutional amendment “because it 
infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process,” a right 
the state court had derived in part from Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and Washington 
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), cases the Romer Court characterized as 
“involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental decisionmaking”). Romer relied on the 
Equal Protection Clause, rather than federalism, to protect lesbigay people from Colorado’s anti-
gay state constitutional amendment. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 145. Cf. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A. 3d 336, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) 
(“New Jersey courts are not limited to the case or controversy requirement imposed on the federal 
courts by way of Article III of the Federal Constitution.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 146. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry at 31, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144) (remarks of Roberts, C.J.) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144a.pdf (“I suppose there might be people out there 
with their own personal standing, someone who performs marriages and would like that to remain 
open to everyone but would prefer not to perform same-sex marriages, or other people. We seem 
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the district court and court of appeals had ruled against the Perry 
plaintiffs and held that Prop 8 was constitutional, they would have 
still been denied marriage licenses and would have had standing to 
ask the Supreme Court to review that decision. If a member of a 
same-sex couple married in California while Prop 8 was enjoined 
contested the validity of the marriage by arguing that Prop 8 was in 
fact constitutional, say in a dispute over custody or marital property, 
he or she might be able to litigate the viability of Prop 8 and appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.147 Or if a third party were tangibly 
affected by a same-sex couple’s marital rights, that party could likely 
claim injury and litigate the validity of Prop 8 and the marriage in 
federal court. Third, if the state official defendants in Perry had 
litigated the case and lost, they would have had federal standing even 
under Perry to appeal to assert the state’s interests.148 Thus, only 
cases that fail to satisfy all of these alternative conditions would 
actually be governed by the Perry ruling. 
At least one anti-LGBT group has tried to extend the reach of 
the Supreme Court’s Perry decision. The Christian right legal 
organization Liberty Counsel149 has argued that Perry limits 
organizations’ ability to intervene as defendants. There is, however, 
as I will address, a distinction between an organization’s procedural 
entitlement to intervene in a federal case that already involves a 
proper case or controversy, and the requirements for intervenors to 
satisfy Article III standing doctrine in order to be able to take an 
appeal, the issue that was before the Supreme Court in Perry. 
Accordingly, Perry is unlikely to have an appreciable effect on 
 
to be addressing the case as if the only options are the proponents here or the State. I'm not sure 
there aren’t other people out there with individual personalized injury that would satisfy Article 
III.”). 
 147. Due to the “domestic relations” exception to federal court jurisdiction, in a diversity suit 
over property dependent on adjudicating the validity of the couple’s marriage, for example, the 
party might not be able to file the suit in federal trial court. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 
504 U.S. 689 (1992) (affirming the existence of, but ultimately finding inapplicable, the domestic 
relations exception). 
 148. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a 
State has a cognizable interest in the continued enforceability of its laws that is harmed by a 
judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 149. See About Us, LIBERTY COUNSEL, http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?pid=14096 (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2013) (Liberty Counsel website characterizing the organization as a “Christian 
Ministry” “dedicated to advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of life, and the family since 
1989”). 
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organizations’ ability to participate in litigation over legislation they 
supported. 
Liberty Counsel represented a group of plaintiffs in Pickup v. 
Brown, a case presenting a constitutional challenge to California’s 
statutory ban on efforts to change the sexual orientation of minors by 
licensed mental healthcare professionals (“sexual orientation change 
efforts” or “SOCE”).150 Pickup was appealed from the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.151 Two days after the Supreme Court’s Perry 
decision, Liberty Counsel sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit arguing 
that Perry precluded standing for “intervening parties such as 
Equality California [‘EQCA’] in this case.”152 As Liberty Counsel 
read Perry, “the Supreme Court held that a public interest group did 
not have Article III standing to defend a law merely because it 
supported the passage and adoption of such a law. . . . The Court 
stated that public interest groups must have an actual injury to 
continue to defend a law that it has supported.”153 
As explained above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry held 
that the ballot sponsors did not have standing to be litigating Prop 8 
by themselves in federal court, and so could not appeal Judge 
Walker’s decision where the state governmental defendants refused 
to do so.154 Perry does not call into question the permissibility of the 
ballot sponsors’ intervening in the federal trial court to help defend 
Prop 8 in a proper case brought challenging Prop 8. Perry was a case 
primarily about standing to appeal.155 
Here, however, assuming the Pickup plaintiffs challenging 
California’s ban on sexual orientation conversion practices on minors 
had standing to sue in federal trial court, nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s Perry decision states that interested groups cannot intervene 
to defend the California law. And, assuming one or more parties with 
 
 150. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 151. Pickup v. Brown, 12-17681, 2012 WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012). 
 152. Plaintiff’s Citation of Supplemental Authorities, Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-17681), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/06 
/28/12-17681%20Supplemental%20Authorities.pdf. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 155. Liberty Counsel’s letter saw the glass half empty, saying the Court of Appeals had 
“merely accepted the district court’s grant of intervention.” Plaintiff’s Citation of Supplemental 
Authorities, supra note 152. 
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standing asked the Ninth Circuit to review a federal trial court 
decision about the ban on appeal,156 it is not clear why anything in 
Perry would keep the law’s backers like EQCA from continuing to 
participate in the litigation. Perry presented a different situation in 
that there would have been no appellate litigation without the Prop 8 
sponsors’ filing an appeal. 
In one of the two cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Pickup v. 
Brown,157 consolidated on appeal with Welch v. Brown,158 the trial 
court had ruled that the challengers were unlikely to prevail and 
denied them a preliminary injunction.159 To the extent the Pickup 
plaintiffs had standing to appeal that decision to the Ninth Circuit, 
which they did if they had standing to file their federal court suit in 
the first place, standing rules should not prevent the law’s supporters, 
such as the pro-LGBT equality nonprofit organization EQCA, from 
joining the state in defending the law on appeal.160 In Welch, the state 
was preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the law at least in some 
circumstances; it therefore has an injury that provides standing to 
appeal,161 and since the state defendants chose to appeal,162 EQCA, 
 
 156. The state of California would be recognized by virtually all as having standing to appeal 
the Welch decision which enjoined the state from enforcing its law banning SOCE on minors. If 
the Pickup plaintiffs suffered an injury entitling them to challenge the law in federal court, then 
that same injury would support their standing to appeal the trial court decision denying them 
injunctive relief. 
 157. Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681, 2012 WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012). 
 158. Welch v. Brown, No. 13-15023 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 159. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-cv-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 4, 2012). 
 160. In the appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel held that it need not decide whether EQCA had 
standing to defend the state law “because the State of California undoubtedly has standing to 
defend its statute, and the presence in a suit of even one party with standing suffices to make a 
claim justiciable.” Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). On the merits, the court rejected the challenges to the law. Id. at 1222. 
  I should note that I assisted Equality California in understanding the potential outcomes 
in the Supreme Court’s marriage cases and the preparation of press releases in conjunction 
therewith and that I joined the board of its affiliated 501(c)(3) organization Equality California 
Institute in January 2014. 
 161. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a 
State has a cognizable interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by a 
judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 
137 (1986)). 
 162. My view of the federalism concerns and state choices implicit in Perry differs from that 
claimed to underlie both Perry and Windsor by Eric Restuccia and Aaron Lindstrom in 
Federalism and the Authority of the States to Define Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-define 
-marriage/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). They lay emphasis on the fact that the attorney general of 
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as the law’s nongovernmental backers, again, should be able to 
continue to participate if it meets the federal standards for 
intervention. (If it did not, then intervention would be improper, but 
not because of the Supreme Court’s Perry decision.) Basically, 
standing doctrine requires that there must be a case or controversy, a 
real live dispute between parties with real stakes in the matter, for a 
case to be in federal court. It is not totally settled, but a majority of 
federal appeals courts have held that if there is such a dispute, then 
others can participate in that litigation too without having to establish 
standing on their own.163 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Pickup that the law 
banning SOCE against minors does not violate the First 
Amendment.164 Its opinion does not squarely address the effect of 
Perry, if any, on the ability of a group like EQCA to intervene to 
defend a law it supports that is germane to its members’ interests. 
The Court of Appeals specifically concluded that it “need not resolve 
[the] question” of Perry’s effect on EQCA’s ability to intervene 
“because the State of California undoubtedly has standing to defend 
its statute, and ‘the presence in a suit of even one party with standing 
 
California chose not to defend or appeal the decision invalidating Proposition 8 and, rather 
wishfully, see the Court as having protected California’s governmental choices to litigate or not. 
See id. (“In Hollingsworth, the Court rejects the standing of private parties to defend the 
constitutionality of a state statute where ‘state officials have chosen not to.’ On their face, as 
holdings, these decisions respect the principles of federalism, honoring the exclusive authority of 
the states to define and to defend marriage.”) The obvious problem with this states’ rights 
Pollyannaism is that, at least according to the California Supreme Court, the state of California 
had chosen to vest defense of Proposition 8 in its official proponents. Thus, the decisions by the 
attorney general and governor of California not to defend the measure should not have been the 
end of the Supreme Court’s concern, had the Court’s decision in Perry really been driven by 
“state sovereignty.” Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Canadian Wheat Board v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338–42 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2009) (addressing circuit split favoring no need for intervenors in a proper case or 
controversy to establish their own Article III standing and siding with that majority view); 
Melissa Waver, Where Standing Closes a Door, May Intervention Open a Window? Article III, 
Rule 24(A), and Climate Change Solutions, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10945, 10952 
& nn.105–07 (2012) (noting circuit split and same majority position). 
 164. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048 (2013) (holding “that SB 1172, as a regulation of 
professional conduct, does not violate the free speech rights of SOCE practitioners or minor 
patients, is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not violate parents’ fundamental rights”), 
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S.Ct. 2871 (2014). Due to the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately address their claim 
“that SB 1172 violates the religion clauses of the First Amendment,” the court “decline[d] to 
address” it but left it open for “[t]he district court [to] do so in the first instance.” 728 F.3d at 
1051 n.3. 
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suffices to make a claim justiciable.’”165 Pickup thus illustrates one 
more reason that it is unclear that Perry will have effects of much 
significance as far as federal court standing law, upon which Perry’s 
holding was based, is concerned. 
III.  FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR 
Unlike in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Windsor166 overcame the threshold jurisdictional issues to 
reach the equal protection merits of the challenge to section 3 of the 
combatively named Defense of Marriage Act.167 DOMA section 3, 
recall, defines marriage as male-female for almost all federal law, 
regardless of whether a state or another jurisdiction allowed a same-
sex couple to marry.168 On the merits, the Court in Windsor held 
section 3 unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples validly 
married in states.169 Unlike Perry in another way, Windsor is likely 
to have significant doctrinal repercussions, as is already becoming 
apparent. 
Section A of this part summarizes the Windsor litigation up 
through the Supreme Court. Although it should be quite clear that the 
Court’s decision invalidating section 3 of DOMA was based on equal 
protection principles, Section B of this part makes the case for that 
conclusion in painstaking detail in light of Justice Scalia’s contention 
in dissent that the Court did not base its ruling on equal protection. 
Section C of this part then considers the potential impact of Windsor 
on suits seeking to make not the federal government, as in Windsor, 
but rather a state recognize a same-sex couple’s marriage from 
another state. Finally, Section D takes up the question of the 
implications of Windsor for constitutional suits seeking to compel 
states themselves to let same-sex couples marry civilly. 
A.  The Windsor Litigation 
United States v. Windsor arose after Edie Windsor’s partner of 
 
 165. Id. at 1050 n.2 (quoting Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 521 F.3d 1238, 1240 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam)). 
 166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 167. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified 
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 168. See id. and note 5 and accompanying text supra. 
 169. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
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forty-four years and wife, Thea Spyer, died.170 They had been legally 
married in Canada after four decades together,171 and the law of their 
home state of New York recognized their marriage.172 If the federal 
government had done likewise, Edie would have qualified for the 
surviving spouse tax exemption from the federal estate tax; however, 
because section 3 of DOMA denied federal recognition of their 
marriage, the government insisted that Edie pay the Treasury 
$363,053.173 She challenged this treatment as denying her the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.174 
After U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he and 
President Barack Obama had concluded that Windsor’s contention 
was correct—that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional as 
applied to validly married same-sex couples—and that the 
Department of Justice would not defend Edie’s lawsuit,175 the House 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group intervened to defend the law, 
acting on a three-to-two party-line vote (with the Republicans voting 
to defend DOMA and the Democrats voting against doing so).176 
The federal district court in Windsor held that section 3 was 
unconstitutional.177 The administration declined to provide Windsor 
her tax refund, even though it believed her legal position correct. 
Rather, both BLAG and the Justice Department appealed the 
 
 170. “Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer shared their lives together as a committed couple for 44 
years. They became a couple in 1965, got engaged in 1967, and married in Canada in 2007, after 
it became legal . . . . Thea died in 2009 . . . .” Windsor v. United States—Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQ), AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/windsor 
-v-united-states-frequently-asked-questions-faq (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 171. See id. 
 172. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 177–78 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. Because the defendant was the federal government, the suit relied on the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state and local government, as 
discussed below. 
 175. Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag 
-223.html. 
 176. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 2-3, United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (timing and vote); David Baumann, The 
Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. Politics, ABOUT.COM, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/gaymarriage 
/a/The-Defense-Of-Marriage-Act.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (noting party-line vote split). 
Later a majority of the House of Representatives voted to authorize the continued defense of 
section 3. 
 177. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
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decision, the latter not seeking reversal but affirmance. While the 
case was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the Justice Department filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
before judgment in the case, which Windsor agreed the Supreme 
Court should grant but which BLAG opposed. Before the Court 
acted on that petition, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court.178 
Strikingly, alone among current court of appeals cases, it held that 
sexual orientation is a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny 
and that DOMA section 3 could not satisfy such scrutiny.179 The 
administration then asked the Court to treat its request as a regular 
certiorari petition (not one requesting unusual review before the 
lower court ruled). 
The Supreme Court granted the administration’s petition for 
certiorari, but the Court also directed the parties to brief whether 
there was a proper case for it to decide in light of the 
administration’s agreement with Edie Windsor that DOMA section 3 
was unconstitutional. After hearing argument, the Court concluded 
that there was a proper case or controversy before it180 and that 
section 3 was indeed unconstitutional.181 The ruling was five-to-four, 
with the Court’s more liberal justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor) joining Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.182 Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas (in opinions by the 
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia) concluded that there was not a 
proper case before the Court, and that even if there were, DOMA 
section 3 did not violate the Constitution’s equality guarantees. 
Justice Alito thought that BLAG had standing to bring the case, but 
agreed with the other dissenters that DOMA section 3 was 
constitutional.183 
Despite expressing skepticism about the Executive’s decision 
not to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA,184 the 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 180. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680. 
 181. Id. at 2693, 2696. 
 182. Id. at 2681. 
 183. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
and in Part I by Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., joined in parts II and III by 
Thomas, J.). 
 184. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court characterized the attorney general’s letter 
announcing that the president had determined section 3 to be unconstitutional and refusing to 
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Windsor majority concluded that “[i]n this case the United States 
retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal 
and in proceedings before this Court” despite the government’s 
position on DOMA’s unconstitutionality.185 The Court accepted that 
the obligation to pay Windsor’s tax refund counts as an injury, 
whether or not the government agrees that it was legally obliged to 
pay, and that “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United 
States refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for 
Article III jurisdiction.”186 To the extent that the posture of the case 
raised prudential concerns, the Court held them allayed by BLAG’s 
substantive defense of section 3 and the importance of resolving the 
question of the constitutionality of this federal law,187 and so the 
Court concluded that “the prudential . . . requirements” of standing 
were met.188 
On the merits, a majority of the Court agreed with the United 
States and Edie Windsor that section 3 of DOMA was 
 
defend its constitutionality as “reflect[ing] the Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a 
definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that heightened equal protection 
scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2683–84. And in further addressing the standing issue, the Court wrote: “The Executive’s 
failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not 
yet established in judicial decisions has created a procedural dilemma.” Id. at 2688. This “wait for 
us” approach to constitutional interpretation has little to commend it in this context, where the 
president and attorney general had faithfully applied the Court’s own precedents addressing the 
factors bearing on heightened scrutiny and reached a conclusion in accord with the great weight 
of scholarly analysis. (This is not just my sense of the literature. An earlier survey of 
constitutional scholarship on marriage rights of same-sex couples published found that sixty-nine 
“of seventy-two articles, notes, comments, or essays focusing primarily on same-sex 
marriage . . . . advocated, supported, or were generally sympathetic to same-sex marriage.” Lynn 
D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. 
REV. 1, 18, 20. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, 
Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, 964 (2010) (concluding that 
“opposition to DOMA within the legal academy has also been strong and consistent and seems to 
be increasing”). 
 185. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 2687–89. Because the Court did not hold that BLAG had independent standing to 
defend DOMA, Windsor need not be seen as blessing an interference with separation of powers (a 
committee of one House of Congress defending a federal law, rather than the executive branch 
defending it) of a kind that might seem akin to that in Perry (initiative proponents who were not 
state officials in any branch seeking to defend the initiative in federal court, unsuccessfully given 
the Court’s holding in Perry). Nor did the Court in Windsor hold that BLAG had a personal 
interest in DOMA that was injured by the its nonenforcement or a judicial ruling that DOMA is 
unconstitutional, so again there is no conflict with the Court’s holding in Perry that the 
proponents lacked such an injury; Windsor simply did not reach BLAG’s standing. 
 188. Id. at 2688. 
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unconstitutional.189 The Court extensively recounted the primary role 
of states (rather than the federal government) in regulating “domestic 
relations” including marriage, an allocation of authority set aside by 
section 3.190 Rather than address “whether this federal intrusion on 
state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the 
federal balance,”191 the Court treated the “unusual character” of the 
discrimination wrought by DOMA as a reason to give “careful 
consideration” to the question of its constitutionality.192 And the 
Court did so, noting the broad sweep of DOMA’s section 3,193 
recounting prejudice expressed in DOMA’s legislative history,194 and 
detailing some of the wide range of economic and dignitary harms 
Section 3 inflicted on married same-sex couples.195 
B.  The Doctrinal Basis for Kennedy’s Opinion of the Court 
As he did in the Supreme Court’s two other major decisions 
widely seen as “gay rights” cases, Romer v. Evans196 and Lawrence 
v. Texas,197 Justice Anthony Kennedy again wrote for the Court in 
United States v. Windsor. Joined by the Court’s four more liberal 
Justices,198 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that section 3 of 
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act,199 which sought to exclude 
same-sex couples from the definition of “marriage” and “spouse” for 
all federal laws,200 was unconstitutional. Contrary to protestations of 
 
 189. Id. at 2693, 2696. 
 190. Id. at 2689–92. 
 191. Id. at 2692. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 2694 (“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code . . . . Among 
the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls are laws pertaining 
to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.”). 
 194. Id. at 2693–94. According to the Court in Windsor, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit was corrected that Congress’s “goal” with section 3 “was ‘to put a thumb on the scales 
and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its marriage laws.’” Id. at 2693 (quoting 
Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 682 F. 3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir. 
2012)). 
 195. Id. at 2694–95. 
 196. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 198. Specifically, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion. 
 199. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419, (codified as amended at 1 U. S. C. § 7 (2013)). 
 200. Section 3 of DOMA amended the federal Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §7, to restrictively 
provide that, regardless of state law,  
in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
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bafflement in Justice Scalia’s obstreperous dissent,201 the Windsor 
majority opinion clearly relied on the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
of equal protection of the laws, as explained in the first subsection 
below.202 Scalia’s slightly better point, however, addressed in the 
next section, was that the significance of federalism in the Court’s 
opinion was underspecified. Indeed, Justice Scalia disparages the 
majority’s rationale for its possible reliance on “some amorphous 
federalism component”203—a point taken up in the second subsection 
following.204 
1.  Equal Protection at Its Core 
Pace Justice Scalia, it should be beyond dispute that the Court’s 
opinion in Windsor was predicated on equal protection principles; 
after all, the Court expressly stated that DOMA “violates basic . . . 
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”205 
I nevertheless make the point here, at some length, in an effort to 
steer lower federal and state courts away from the confusion Scalia is 
seemingly trying to sow. First, the sole question presented in the U.S. 
government’s petition for certiorari in Windsor was “[w]hether 
Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex 
who are legally married under the laws of their State.”206 Since the 
Supreme Court is only supposed to decide that question or subsidiary 
questions “fairly included therein,”207 the Court would have strayed 
far from its officially approved practice if it did not address that 
equal protection question. 
Second, in turning to the merits of the constitutional challenge, 
 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife.  
Id. 
 201. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 202. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 203. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 204. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 205. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion). I discuss this language, and what the 
ellipsis replaces, at text accompanying note 227 infra. 
 206. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at i, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). 
 207. Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a). 
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after recounting the basic facts of Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer’s 
wedding the Court’s opinion “conclude[d] that, until recent years, 
many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two 
persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and 
dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.”208 This 
language of “occupy[ing] the same status and dignity” sounds in 
equal protection, a constitutional protection which the Court’s earlier 
opinion in Romer v. Evans209 suggested is suspicious of “status-based 
enactment[s]” or “a classification of persons undertaken for its own 
sake.”210 Although only a minority of states allowed same-sex 
couples to marry,211 the Court understood those states to have 
“decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and so 
live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of 
equality with all other married persons.”212 When the Court’s opinion 
turned to analyzing section 3’s constitutionality, the Court observed 
that “its operation is directed to a class of persons that the laws of 
New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to protect.”213 This 
discussion about “a class of persons” is likewise language of equal 
protection, which has long been understood to prohibit “class 
legislation”214 and whose constitutional doctrine focuses on the 
 
 208. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 209. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 210. See id. at 635. 
 211. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11 
other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to 
marry . . . .”); Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal 
-encyclopedia/same-sex-marriage-developments-the-law.html (“After a long, drawn-out marriage 
equality battle, California became the 13th state to recognize same-sex marriage.”) (last updated 
Dec. 5, 2013); Kate Zernika & Marc Santora, As Gays Wed in New Jersey, Christie Ends Court 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/nyregion/christie-
withdraws-appeal-of-same-sex-marriage-ruling-in-new-jersey.html (“His decision not to appeal a 
judge’s ruling that allowed the weddings removed the last hurdle to legalized same-sex marriage 
in New Jersey, making it the 14th state, along with the District of Columbia, to allow gay couples 
to wed.”); Courtney Subramanian, Hawaii Governor Signs Gay Marriage Bill, TIME, 
http://nation.time.com/2013/11/13/hawaii-governor-signs-gay-marriage-bill/ (Nov. 13, 2013) 
(“The new measure allows gay residents and tourists to wed beginning Dec. 2, adding to the 14 
states and District of Columbia where same sex marriage is legal.”); Dana Davidsen, Illinois 
Becomes 16th State to Allow Same-sex Marriage, CNN (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/20/illinois-becomes-16th-state-to-allow-same-sex-
marriage/ (“The measure will go into effect June 14, 2014.”). 
 212. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2960 (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. Cruz, supra note 38. 
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“classification” embodied in challenged government action.215 
The Court continued its focus on inequality when it observed 
that “DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, 
benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married 
couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to 
constitutional guarantees, from one state to the next.”216 Viewed this 
way, DOMA’s discrimination was unusual, and the Court had 
affirmed in Romer v. Evans,217 quoting Louisville Gas and Electric 
Co. v. Coleman,218 that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character 
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they 
are obnoxious to the constitutional provision[.]”219 “[T]he 
constitutional provision” at issue in Romer and Louisville Gas & 
Electric Co. was the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,220 again showing that Windsor is an equal protection 
decision. 
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause does not by its terms 
apply to the federal government; rather, it provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”221 Where the federal government is 
concerned, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is the 
primary textual home of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
constitutional equality, as the Court’s doctrine for decades has 
recognized.222 As the Court said in Brown v. Board of Education’s 
companion case Bolling v. Sharpe,223 “discrimination may be so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”224 That is, certain 
unequal treatment deprives people of liberty (or property or even life, 
one might suppose) without due process of law. This doctrinal 
 
 215. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Affirmative Action and the “Individual” Right to Equal 
Protection, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 241, 245–63 (2009) (addressing “The Supreme Court Precedents 
on Equality as a Limit on Governmental Classification”). 
 216. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
 217. 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 218. 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928). 
 219. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.  
 220. Id. at 631; Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 227 U.S. at 36. 
 221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
 222. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 223. Bolling, 347 U.S. 497.  
 224. Id. at 499 (condemning racial school segregation by the District of Columbia, a federal 
governmental entity). 
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guarantee is commonly known as “the equal protection component of 
the Due Process Clause” of the Fifth Amendment.225 
That is why the Court’s opinion in Windsor says that the case 
requires the Court “to address whether the resulting injury and 
indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.”226 Because the federal government is 
subjected to equal protection commands through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Windsor opinion’s declaration 
that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government”227 should be 
unexceptionable. When the Supreme Court criticized DOMA 
because it “seeks to injure” same-sex couples married under state 
law, the Court repeated its forty-year-old conclusion that “[t]he 
Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that 
a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”228 This invocation 
of “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality” clearly signals that 
equal protection was doing the work here, as does the Court’s focus 
on “disparate treatment,” a core equal protection concern.229 
Moreover, the case that articulated this principle quoted in Windsor, 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,230 was one in which the Court 
held a federal law violated the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment (as Justice Scalia acknowledges in his Windsor 
dissent).231 
The Court in Windsor explained the deficiencies of section 3 in 
terms that should leave no room for doubt that the Court held that the 
law violates equal protection principles. In discussing the breadth of 
the law, the Court observed that “DOMA writes inequality into the 
entire United States Code.”232 The Court identified section 3’s 
purpose and effects with inequality: “DOMA’s principal effect is to 
 
 225. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009); see, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675, 2706 n.5 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 533 (1973)). 
 226. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion). 
 227. Id. at 2693. 
 228. Id. (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35). 
 229. Id. 
 230. 413 U. S. 528 (1973). 
 231. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 2694. 
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identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them 
unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality. . . .”233 
When the Windsor Court concluded that it must “hold, as it now 
does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of 
the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution[,]”234 the Court was invoking the Constitution’s equal 
protection obligation on the federal government.235 The very next 
sentence of the opinion explained unequivocally that “[t]he liberty 
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains 
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal 
protection of the laws.”236 In support of this contention, the Windsor 
opinion cited Bolling v. Sharpe,237 the first Supreme Court case that 
expressly held there to be an equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Peña, which held that the equal protection standard applicable 
to the federal government under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is coextensive with the equal protection standard 
applicable to the states through the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.238 
All the preceding might sound like overkill to establish the 
obvious meaning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in 
Windsor. What warrants the extended explication is that Justice 
Scalia purported to be perplexed239 by the majority’s statement that 
“[w]hile the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the 
power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth 
Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood 
and preserved.”240 “The only possible interpretation of this 
statement,” Scalia asserted, “is that the Equal Protection Clause, even 
the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process 
Clause, is not the basis for today’s holding.”241 Scalia did not offer 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 2695. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). 
 238. 515 U.S. 200, 217–218 (1995). 
 239. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. at 2695 (majority opinion). 
 241. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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any explanation for why he interpreted the Court’s sentence in the 
counterintuitive way that he did, perhaps because there is no 
legitimate explanation. 
The Court forthrightly stated in the first half of its sentence 
under discussion here that the Fifth Amendment rendered section 3 
of DOMA unconstitutional.242 That first half of the sentence neither 
expressly asserted nor denied that it is the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of that amendment which 
rendered section 3 unconstitutional.243 But the second half of the 
contested sentence is entirely consistent with this Article’s foregoing 
equal protection analysis. In saying that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause makes the Fifth Amendment 
right against such stigmatizing class legislation more specific, 
comprehended, and meaningful, the Court is simply echoing what 
the Supreme Court said in Bolling v. Sharpe back in 1954: “The 
‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of 
prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law,’ . . . [b]ut, as this 
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be 
violative of due process.”244 As scholars including Akhil Amar have 
recognized, one function of the later-enacted Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to clarify the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.245 And as for the notion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s specification of the equal protection mandate makes 
the right to due process better understood and protected, recall Chief 
Justice Marshall’s words for the Court in Marbury v. Madison: “The 
powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is 
written.”246 
The only potentially real question is not whether equal 
protection undergirds the Court’s holding in Windsor, but whether 
the opinion also rests on substantive due process protection of liberty 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 245. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 772 (1999) (“[F]or 
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the words of its Equal Protection Clause 
were not expressing a different idea than the words of the Due Process Clause but were 
elaborating the same idea: the Equal Protection Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due 
process idea.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 246. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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and perhaps fundamental rights.247 Justice Scalia’s dissent, not 
without reason, sees indications of “the dread” doctrine of 
“substantive due process” in the majority opinion.248 He wrote: 
The majority opinion . . . says that DOMA is 
unconstitutional as “a deprivation of the liberty of the 
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution[]”; that it violates “basic due process” 
principles; and that it inflicts an “injury and indignity” of a 
kind that denies “an essential part of the liberty protected by 
the Fifth Amendment.”249 
“And,” Windsor stated, “though Congress has great authority to 
design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it 
cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”250 
Although there are coherent arguments that Windsor only used 
substantive due process’s fundamental right to marry to inform an 
analysis grounded squarely in equal protection doctrine,251 marriage 
equality litigation has already relied on Windsor in suits pressing not 
just equal protection claims but also substantive due 
process/fundamental rights claims. In Pennsylvania, for example, the 
ACLU is suing the state, arguing that its refusal to let same-sex 
couples marry and its refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex 
couples validly entered in other states are unconstitutional.252 The 
ACLU253 argues that “Pennsylvania’s exclusion of same-sex couples 
 
 247. See, e.g., Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, not “Argle 
Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 25 
(arguing that Windsor is an “equal liberty” case that “unif[ies] principles of equal protection and 
liberty”) (2014). 
 248. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. at 2706 (citations omitted) (quoting majority opinion at 2695, 2693, and 2692, 
respectively). 
 250. Id. at 2695 (majority opinion). 
 251. See Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 220, 230 
(2013) (concluding that Windsor “is conceptually, if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case” but 
that “Justice Kennedy’s opinion ultimately rests on equal protection grounds”). 
 252. See Whitewood v. Corbett, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (July 11, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/whitewood-v-corbett. Although I served as a board-elected 
general counsel for the national ACLU during some of the period of the preparation of this 
Article, I did not participate in the Whitewood litigation. See also Complaint, Paladino v. Corbett, 
No. 2:13-cv-5641 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013) (seeking recognition by Pennsylvania of marriage 
same-sex couple entered in Massachusetts). 
 253. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Whitewood v. Corbett, No. 1-13-
AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM  9/25/2014 4:43 PM 
434 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:393 
 
from marriage infringes on the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”254 Independently of the discrimination argument under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs argue that Pennsylvania’s 
denial of marriage to same-sex couples should be held to strict 
scrutiny “because it burdens the fundamental right to marry.”255 Most 
of the complaint does not differentiate between the equal protection 
and due process claims.256 Thus, the introduction of the complaint 
argues that “[t]he exclusion from marriage undermines the plaintiff 
couples’ ability to achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their 
mutual economic stability, and denies them,” here quoting Windsor, 
“‘a dignity and status of immense import.’”257 
More dramatically, at least one complaint as of the initial 
writing of this Article appears to have already interpreted Windsor to 
mean that the Due Process Clause’s substantive protection of 
“liberty” embraces same-sex couples’ freedom to marry.258 In Griego 
v. Oliver,259 six couples challenged New Mexico’s refusal to allow 
same-sex couples to marry civilly or to recognize same-sex couples’ 
marriages validly entered in other jurisdictions.260 In seeking 
(ultimately unsuccessfully)261 a writ of mandamus from the New 
Mexico Supreme Court to shorten the litigation, the Griego plaintiffs 
relied on federal precedent to argue that “[b]arring same-sex couples 
 
cv-01861-1 (filed July 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/whitewood 
_v._corbett_--_complaint.pdf. 
 254. Id. ¶ 15, at 5. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 258. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Griego v. Oliver, No. 
D-202-CV-2013-02757, 2013 WL 4879250, at *1 (D. N.M. Aug. 21, 2013). 
 259. Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-2013-02757, 2013 WL 4716361 (D. N.M. Aug. 26, 
2013). The New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the 
marriage non-recognition laws violated the state constitution’s equal protection clause. Griego v. 
Oliver, 316 P.2d 865 (N.M. 2013). 
 260. I should note that I am close friends with one of the plaintiff couples who sought 
recognition of an extraterritorially entered marriage. 
 261. See Steve Terrell, NM High Court Won't Immediately Hear Marriage Equality Cases, 
ROUNDHOUSE ROUNDUP: THE BLOG, http://roundhouseroundup.blogspot.com/2013/08/nm-high-
court-wont-immediately-hear.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2006) (reporting denial without prejudice 
of petition for writ of mandamus in Griego v. Oliver); Order, Hanna v. Salazar, No. 34,216 (N.M. 
Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/160797573/NM-SUPREME-ORDER 
-DENYING-IMMEDIATE-CONSIDERATION-of-SAME-SEX-MARRIAGE-CASES (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2013) (denying without prejudice petition for writ of mandamus). 
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from marriage violates New Mexico’s due process guarantee by 
depriving them of the fundamental right to marry.”262 In arguing that 
“denying recognition to same-sex couples who legally married in 
another jurisdiction would . . . violate their right to due process under 
the New Mexico Constitution,” the Griego plaintiffs read Windsor to 
have “specifically held that married same-sex couples who are 
legally married under state law have a protected liberty interest in 
their marriage under the federal Due Process Clause.”263 The 
language they quoted from Windsor? “DOMA is unconstitutional as 
a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution.”264 
The Supreme Court undeniably said that. And it is one of the 
passages to which Justice Scalia pointed in accusing the Court of 
relying on substantive due process to invalidate section 3 of 
DOMA.265 Scalia may have made this interpretive claim in order to 
further his apparent desire to minimize the import of Windsor, 
expecting that “lower federal courts and state courts can distinguish 
today’s case when the issue before them is state denial of marital 
status to same-sex couples”266 and exhorting them to do so.267 Yet I 
have already explained why the Court’s language is best understood 
as reflecting reliance on the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Ironically, then, in light of the 
Griego plaintiffs’ use of Windsor to support a substantive liberty-
based (as distinguished from equality-based) argument against 
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage, Scalia’s studied 
obtuseness, which had him denying that the Court’s holding rested 
on equal protection and suggesting that it might rest on substantive 
due process, may in the lower courts actually undermine his 
preferred view that the Constitution poses no obstacle to states’ 
 
 262. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 20, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-2013 
-02757, 2013 WL 4879250) (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/151566993 
/New-Mexico-Supreme-Court-Writ-of-Mandamus (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 263. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)). 
 264. Id. at 23 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680). 
 265. See supra text accompanying footnote 264–265. 
 266. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 267. See id. (avowing that “an opinion with such scatter-shot rationales as this one . . . can be 
distinguished in many ways,” opining that the majority’s opinion “deserves to be” so 
distinguished, and bluntly concluding that “[s]tate and lower federal courts should take the Court 
at its word and distinguish away”). 
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excluding same-sex couples from marriage. 
2.  “Amorphous Federalism” in the Court’s Reasoning 
Justice Scalia’s grousing about the role of federalism in the 
Windsor majority opinion is not as baseless as his denial that the 
opinion rests on equal protection principles. He questioned why the 
majority opinion continued to advert to “the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” even after it 
“formally disclaimed reliance upon principles of federalism.”268 At 
the end of the day, for Scalia, “[t]he sum of all the Court’s 
nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-
protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and 
perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a 
role). . . .”269 While there is some merit to his concerns, I do not think 
the Court’s deployment of federalism is as indistinct as Justice Scalia 
suggests. 
One could certainly envision an opinion relying on federalism as 
a factor of unspecified weight and/or unclear doctrinal significance. 
The Court could have relied on the fact that DOMA section 3 
regulates marriage, part of domestic relations, which is “one of the 
still paradigmatic cases of matters said to lie properly with the 
states.”270 That fact could have been said to “weigh against” the 
constitutionality of the law, without the Court ever attempting to 
quantify such weight.271 I myself previously sketched what such an 
“uncategorical” treatment of federalism objections to DOMA section 
3 might look like.272 The regulation of “domestic relations” could 
have been just one of a series of unquantified (or “amorphous,” in 
 
 268. Id. at 2705 (quoting majority opinion at 2693). 
 269. Id. at 2707. This concession of the possibility of an equal protection basis for the Court’s 
holding in Windsor contradicts Scalia’s earlier assertion that “the Equal Protection Clause, even 
the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process Clause, is not the basis for today’s 
holding.” Id. at 2706. 
 270. David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 805, 817 (2011). 
 271. Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (criticizing notion of interest “balancing” because “the interests on both sides are 
incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock 
is heavy”). 
 272. See Cruz, supra note 270, at 814–27 (identifying several factors that collectively might 
be taken to render DOMA section 3 unconstitutional on federalism grounds). 
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Scalia’s parlance273) factors informing a judgment that section 3 was 
unconstitutional: It was a federal law that operates in the core of the 
field of domestic relations, an arena historically and to this day still 
frequently said to be the near-exclusive preserve of state authority.274 
It operated, not in discrete operational settings carefully judged by 
Congress to require federal displacement of state law definitions of 
marital status, but across the board in virtually any area in which the 
federal government acts.275 It purported to be a definitional statute, 
but it selectively excluded married couples (of the same-sex) who are 
in fact married under state laws that the federal government 
otherwise uses for determining people’s marital status, thus casting 
egalitarian state laws and couples who have taken advantage of them 
in a false light.276 But that is not how the Court in Windsor treated 
federalism. 
The Windsor opinion recounted the process whereby New York 
and some other states “concluded that same-sex marriage ought to be 
given recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples 
who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other” 
because the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage “came to be 
seen [there] as an unjust exclusion.”277 Then, the Court in Windsor 
asserted that as the “beginning point” for deciding whether section 3 
was unconstitutional it should consider “the design, purpose, and 
effect of DOMA . . . [a]gainst this background of lawful same-sex 
marriage in some states.”278 Thus, the Court in its initial brush with 
federalism in Windsor suggested that the legal landscape provides 
important context against which to assess the structure, intent, and 
consequences of section 3 of DOMA. This suggestion is completely 
unexceptional. 
“By history and tradition the definition and regulation of 
marriage,” the Court next summarized, “has been treated as being 
within the authority and realm of the separate States.”279 At the same 
time, the federal government had over time adopted laws “that bear 
 
 273. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 274. Cruz, supra note 270, at 827. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 277. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 2689–90. 
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on marital rights and privileges” or “affect marriages and family 
status.”280 Governmental authority over civil marriage thus had been 
shared between federal and state governments, so the Court was not 
saying that merely touching on domestic relations made section 3 of 
DOMA unconstitutional. Yet DOMA appeared to the Court different 
from earlier federal actions where Congress enacted “discrete 
statutes” or somewhat narrowly “limited federal laws” to further 
constitutionally permissible federal policies.281 Thus, section 3’s 
constitutionality cannot be taken for granted but must be analyzed. 
DOMA’s applicability to nearly the entirety of federal law appears 
against this background as an “intervention” in the usual distribution 
of marriage regulations.282 
“In order to assess the validity of that intervention,” the Court 
maintained, “it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power 
and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.”283 
This pronunciamento seems to be key to Justice Scalia’s objections. 
For after providing what Scalia counts as “seven full pages about the 
traditional power of States to define domestic relations,”284 the 
majority opinion concluded that “it is unnecessary to decide whether 
this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution 
because it disrupts the federal balance.”285 Because Scalia thought 
that “no one questions the power of the states to define marriage 
(with the concomitant conferral of dignity and status),” he could not 
see “the point of devoting seven pages to describing how long and 
well established that power is[.]”286 
But whether contested or not, the pedigree and breadth of state 
authority over marriage, and domestic relations more generally, is 
 
 280. Id. at 2690. 
 281. Id.; cf. Cruz, supra note 270, at 822 (“With the enactment of section 3 of DOMA, 
Congress created a type of federal family law that is very different from the definitional sections 
of individual statutes, which apply only within the boundaries of those statutes.”). 
 282. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 285. Id. at 2692 (majority opinion). 
 286. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He means of course, as does the majority, see id. at 
2691 (majority opinion) (“State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the 
constitutional rights of persons . . . .”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), that no one 
disputes that states generally have authority to define civil marriage, even though the Constitution 
makes certain definitions impermissible. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (holding restrictions on 
interracial marriages unconstitutional). 
AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM  9/25/2014 4:43 PM 
2014] “AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM” 439 
 
relevant on the majority’s terms, terms that are quite comprehensible 
within conventional equal protection doctrine, without recourse to 
the kind of “amorphous federalism” that Scalia took the Court to be 
arguing. In particular, as the Court went on to explain, the  
deep-rootedness of state (rather than federal) authority over marriage 
serves an evidentiary function.287 DOMA section 3 is unusual in that 
it “rejects the long established precept that the incidents, benefits, 
and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples 
within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional 
guarantees, from one State to the next.”288 And as noted above, the 
Court said again that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character 
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they 
are obnoxious to [equal protection].”289 Since “DOMA, because of 
its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of 
reliance on state law to define marriage[,]”290 the Court should be 
understood to believe DOMA more likely reflects animus against 
same-sex couples than would a federal law that adhered to the more 
usual allocation of governmental authority.291 In the Windsor 
majority’s own words, 
the responsibility of the States for the regulation of 
domestic relations is an important indicator of the 
substantial societal impact the State’s classifications have in 
the daily lives and customs of its people. DOMA’s unusual 
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and 
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to 
deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and 
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of 
their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the 
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.292 
This evidentiary inference is plausible, and more plausible than 
 
 287. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See quoted text accompanying note 219 supra. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. at 2693 (“In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or 
purpose, discriminations of an unusual character especially require careful consideration.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 292. Id. The Court does not state that this deviation is the sole evidence of animus, and it 
discussed other evidence at id. at 2693–95. I do not address that evidence here because I am 
focusing on the role of federalism in the Court’s analysis. 
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others enshrined in the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.293 If a particular tradition allocating authority to the 
states is both broad and deep, one might expect that the federal 
government would have powerful reasons before it derogates from it. 
In order to determine whether the United States has such reasons, 
courts must give the challenged, unusual law “careful consideration”; 
otherwise, if the lenient rational basis review typically applied to 
economic regulations were used, the Court would only assess 
whether the law has the most tenuous conceivable connection to 
some merely legitimate governmental purpose. Without looking for 
more persuasive justifications for the deviation, a reviewing court 
might not be able to tell whether or not the deviant policy is 
grounded in animus or instead justified by public-regarding 
purposes. This, at any rate, is the “smoking out” rationale of strict 
scrutiny, which holds that strict scrutiny is necessary for courts to 
determine whether particular governmental uses of race are 
“compelling.”294 
Of course, racial classifications receive strict scrutiny under 
current equal protection doctrine, and the Court has not specified the 
level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation discrimination.295 
As Justice Scalia noted in his Windsor dissent, the majority “opinion 
 
 293. Consider, for example, the Court’s argument in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1996). There, in the course of holding that Congress lacked the ability to use its Article I powers 
to “commandeer” state or local law enforcement officials to enforce federal programs, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion argued that “if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly 
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.” Id. at 
905. In reality, as Justice Stevens’s dissent explained, “[t]he Court’s evaluation of the historical 
evidence . . . fails to acknowledge the important difference between policy decisions that may 
have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, and decisions that are compelled 
by the Constitution.” Id. at 952–53 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting). “Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of state government 
readily explains Congress’ sparing use of this otherwise ‘highly attractive’ . . . power. Congress’ 
discretion, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, indicates not that the power does not exist, but 
rather that the interests of the States are more than sufficiently protected by their participation in 
the National Government.” Id. at 953 n.12. 
 294. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 
 295. Were discrimination against same-sex couples recognized as a form of sex 
discrimination, see, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay 
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the 
Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 
(2001); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex 
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (2007), 
which it is, extant doctrine would call for heightened or intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
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does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been 
the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman 
are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”296 So, it may be that, if 
DOMA’s deviation from the historical exercises of governmental 
authority over marriage is relevant for the animus- or purpose-based 
reason just sketched, Windsor may in the future be best understood 
as employing a form of heightened scrutiny.297 That is, by using an 
unspecified form of scrutiny to “smoke out” the anti-lesbigay animus 
behind DOMA, Windsor may seem (as Scalia charged) to apply 
something more akin to heightened scrutiny than rational basis 
review, and so may come to stand for the proposition that equal 
protection demands heightened scrutiny when the government 
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. 
C.  Windsor and Interstate Recognition of Marriages 
Among the marriage-related issues that Windsor does not 
expressly address is whether it is constitutional for a state to refuse to 
recognize a same-sex couple’s marriage from another state or 
country. This is distinct from the issue of whether a state must itself 
allow same-sex couples to marry, which the next section addresses. It 
is a question that, like virtually all litigated constitutional issues,298 
will ultimately not be answered solely by logic; rather, the meaning 
of Windsor for questions of interstate recognition will unfold with 
experience and time. But not necessarily a lot of time and experience. 
On July 11, 2013, fifteen days after the Supreme Court decided the 
 
 296. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 297. Accord id. (“But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that 
deferential framework [i.e., rational basis review].”). This observation might be compared to 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). There, she concluded that Texas’s law criminalizing oral and anal sex, when 
engaged in by two people of the same sex, failed “a more searching form of rational basis 
review . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Justice Scalia criticized Justice O’Connor’s standard as unprecedented and 
underspecified, id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and suggested it must mean at a minimum that if 
a law did “exhibit a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, it would be unconstitutional 
even if it had a rational basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That would be more 
stringent judicial review than that ordinarily understood to be mandated under the rational basis 
standard. 
 298. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
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marriage cases, Ohio residents James Obergefell and John Arthur 
flew to Maryland to be married, since Ohio law neither allows nor 
recognizes marriages of same-sex couples.299 After returning to 
Ohio, they filed suit against Ohio’s governor and other defendants on 
July 19.300 Arthur was terminally ill,301 and the suit sought to ensure 
that the state would recognize their Maryland marriage so that when 
it came time to issue a death certificate, it would list Arthur’s marital 
status as “married” and record Obergefell as his surviving spouse.302 
The ACLU filed similar suits seeking to use equal protection to 
compel interstate recognition of valid marriages of same-sex couples, 
as well as an affirmative right to marry in the state, in New 
Mexico303 and Pennsylvania.304 On Obergfell and Arthur’s request 
for a temporary restraining order, the judge relied on Windsor to 
conclude that they showed a strong likelihood that they would prove 
that failure to recognize their marriage for purposes of the death 
certificate would violate equal protection.305 (Although Arthur died 
after receiving preliminary injunctive relief,306 an amended 
complaint added a funeral director bringing claims on behalf of 
same-sex couples, and the district court rejected the government’s 
attempt to have the case dismissed after Arthur’s death.307) 
Unlike the federal government, state governments historically 
 
 299. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 
2013). 
 300. Verified Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/155109542/1-13-cv-00501-1. 
 301. See id. at 2 (characterizing Arthur as a “hospice patient” “suffer[ing] from debilitating 
ALS disease”); id. at 6 (noting that “John is likely to die soon”). 
 302. Id. at 6. 
 303. Complaint, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-201302757 (D. N.M. Mar. 21, 2013), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/griego-v-oliver; see also Second Amended 
Complaint, Griego v. Oliver, No. D-202-CV-201302757 (D. N.M. Aug. 21, 2013). 
 304. Complaint, Whitewood v. Corbett, No.13-1861-JE, (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2013); see also 
ACLU Seeks Freedom to Marry for Pennsylvania Couples, ACLU (July 9, 2013), https://www 
.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/aclu-seeks-freedom-marry-pennsylvania-couples. Cf. Complaint, Palladino v. 
Corbett, No. 2:13-cv-5641-MAM (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013), available at  
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-PA-0013-0001.pdf (same-sex couple’s interstate 
recognition suit filed by private counsel). 
 305. Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *4–5, *7 (S.D. Ohio 
July 22, 2013). 
 306. Julie Zimmerman, John Arthur, Who Challenged Same-Sex Marriage Ban, Has Died, 
CINCINATTI.COM (Oct. 22, 2013), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20131022/NEWS0104 
/310220031/. 
 307. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 2013 WL 5934007 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2013). 
AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM  9/25/2014 4:43 PM 
2014] “AMORPHOUS FEDERALISM” 443 
 
regulated marriage and decided, subject to constitutional restrictions, 
which marriages from other jurisdictions to recognize.308 Therefore, 
the Ohio court could have distinguished Windsor on that basis. 
Instead, the judge concluded that Ohio’s action was in its own way 
unprecedented, much as the federal marriage exclusion in DOMA 
was unprecedented.309 Historically, Ohio treated as valid any 
marriages that were valid where entered, even if Ohio would not 
itself let such a couple marry.310 Thus, Ohio will recognize a 
different-sex marriage of a minor311 or of first cousins.312 Apparently 
the only couples whose validly entered marriages it will categorically 
not recognize are same-sex couples.313 As with DOMA in Windsor, 
the court here said that the only purpose such discriminatory 
government action served was to impose inequality and make gay 
people unequal under law, an impermissible purpose, and it was 
therefore probably unconstitutional.314 
This reasoning will not be persuasive to everyone. In his 
Windsor dissent, Chief Justice Roberts saw nothing suspicious in 
Congress’s generally accepting the validity of marriages approved by 
states—even where states adopted different eligibility criteria—but 
carving out an exception to this recognition where the sex of the 
parties to a marriage was not to Congress’s liking: 
[N]one of those prior state-by-state variations [accepted by 
Congress] had involved differences over something—as the 
majority puts it—“thought of by most people as essential to 
the very definition of [marriage] and to its role and function 
throughout the history of civilization.” That the Federal 
Government treated this fundamental question differently 
than it treated variations over consanguinity or minimum 
 
 308. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013); Obergefell, 2013 WL 
3814262, at *5. 
 309. See Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262, at *4–*6. 
 310. Id. at *5–*6. 
 311. Id. at *5. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See, e.g., id. at *4–*5; State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order, Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262 (No. 1:13-CV-501), available 
at http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/ohio-officials-ordered-to-recognize-gay-couples 
-marriage (not identifying any class of marriages validly entered in other jurisdictions 
categorically denied recognition in Ohio other than those of same-sex couples). 
 314. Obergefell, 2013 WL 3814262, at *6, available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/07/Judge-Black-ruling-on-marriage-7-22.pdf. 
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age is hardly surprising . . . .315 
Likewise, the National Review published commentary on the 
Obergefell ruling in which Ed Whelan jumped from Windsor’s 
recognition that “[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful and 
legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within 
its borders”316 to a supposed corollary “that a state, in determining 
which out-of-state marriages to recognize, has broad authority to 
regard some components of marriage as essential and others as 
incidental[,]”317 and then to the conclusion that “[t]here is . . . no 
inconsistency between Ohio’s general practice of regarding age of 
consent and degrees of consanguinity as (within certain bounds) 
incidental and its view that the male-female component of marriage 
is essential.”318 And absent any treatment of same-sex couples he 
would recognize as inconsistent with Ohio’s treatment of other 
couples, Whelan presumably saw nothing suspicious about the 
state’s specifically targeted denial of recognition of same-sex 
couples’ marriages. 
Even some supporters of marriage equality have been critical of 
the district court’s reasoning in Obergefell. Steve Sanders suggested 
that “[t]he opinion relied on a reading of [Windsor] that was 
probably too simplistic” and criticized the judge for reasoning from 
“a few soundbites from Windsor (taken out of the federalism context 
Justice Kennedy was careful to provide).”319 Yet, unless one buys 
into an argument like Whelan’s that marriages of same-sex couples 
somehow differ “essential[ly]” from marriages of different-sex 
couples (regardless of procreative capacity or lack thereof),320 
Obergefell’s reasoning about the unprecedentedness of Ohio’s rule of 
nonrecognition for same-sex couples’ marriages from states that 
 
 315. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 316. Id. at 2691 (majority opinion) (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 
(1942)). 
 317. Ed Whelan, Federal-Court Ruling Against Ohio’s Marriage Laws, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/354422/federal-court-ruling-against 
-ohios-marriage-laws-ed-whelan (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Steve Sanders, A New Front for Marriage Equality: Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages 
from Other States, ACSBLOG (July 31, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/a-new-front-for 
-marriage-equality-recognizing-same-sex- marriages-from-other-states. 
 320. Cf. NeJaime, supra note 251, at 223, 244 (arguing that Windsor conceptualizes marriage 
in way that renders same-sex couples and different-sex couples “similarly situated”). 
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allow them is strong. It parallels Windsor’s reasoning about the 
unprecedentedness of DOMA’s rule of nonrecognition for same-sex 
couples’ marriages from states that allow them, though of course in a 
different legal context. 
Sanders’s bigger concern seems to be Obergefell’s reliance on 
equal protection doctrine as opposed to substantive due process.321 
Sanders appeared not to like the use of equal protection here to yield 
a requirement that Ohio recognize a Maryland marriage of a  
same-sex couple, because the same analysis would likely also yield a 
requirement that Ohio itself allow same-sex couples to marry 
civilly.322 And, following incrementalist instincts, Sanders apparently 
would prefer courts in the position of this one to rely on doctrines 
that would be limited to interstate marriage recognition, not  
full-blown equal freedom to marry, until such time as the Supreme 
Court itself blesses the right to marry for same-sex couples.323 
Yet, even if Sanders were correct that it would be “a much 
deeper injury to your liberty, privacy and autonomy to have an 
existing marriage effectively taken away from you by a state that 
refuses to recognize it” than it is “to be denied the right to marry the 
person you choose,”324 that would not mean that it is not also a 
constitutional violation for a state to refuse to let two loving people 
marry because they are of the same sex. So, it is not clear that 
litigation seeking recognition of a same-sex couple’s marriage 
 
 321. Sanders, supra note 319 (“But the biggest problem, I think, is Judge Black’s use of equal 
protection as the basis for the decision.”); id. (“I would locate constitutional protection for an 
existing marriage in substantive and procedural due process, not equal protection.”). 
 322. Id. (“If Judge Black is correct . . . , then it is hard to see why it isn’t just as much of a 
problem for Ohio to refuse to license same-sex marriages on equal terms with heterosexual 
unions.”). 
 323. Id. (“[U]ntil the Supreme Court resolves the question of gay marriage for the whole 
country, there are compelling reasons to distinguish between a right to get married and a separate 
right to remain married.”). 
 324. Id. I am far from convinced that State B’s refusal to recognize a marriage from State A 
effectively takes away a couple’s marriage. State A still recognizes it, as do marriage equality 
states, as does the federal government and presumably the other jurisdictions in the world that 
have embraced marriage equality (all of which also calls into question Sanders’s assessment of 
comparative badness). Granted, State B would not be treating the couple as married, which would 
have untoward consequences for the couple. Yet it is not self-evident that State A can with an 
administrative act such as marrying someone confer upon a couple a right to particular legal 
treatment by State B in the wide range of circumstances to which civil marriage may be legally 
married. For an examination of such concerns in the different context of state decisions about 
what sex a person is, see generally David B. Cruz, Sexual Judgments: Full Faith and Credit and 
the Relational Character of Legal Sex, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51 (2011). 
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celebrated in another state ought to eschew constitutional doctrines 
that could yield a right to marry. Indeed, even Sanders’s full law 
journal article on the subject concludes that at least if one accepts his 
due process liberty interest in having one’s marriage recognized 
(which recognition he takes as necessary for one to “remain 
married”), “a state that gives recognition to heterosexual marriages 
but denies it to same-sex marriages ends up with an equal protection 
problem.”325 That is what Obergefell concludes, and it is an 
eminently reasonable conclusion, consistent with, if not dictated by, 
Windsor. 
D.  Windsor and State Marriage Bans 
Yet another marriage-related issue not expressly resolved by 
Windsor, and perhaps the biggest,326 is whether it is constitutional for 
a state to refuse to let same-sex couples civilly marry in the first 
instance. Windsor was about whether the federal government must 
recognize marriages of same-sex couples that states had chosen to 
allow. Indeed, the majority opinion in Windsor stated that “[t]his 
opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”327 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent correctly parsed the reference to 
“those lawful marriages” to mean that the Court’s conclusion was 
confined to the unconstitutionality of DOMA’s discrimination 
against same-sex couples validly married by some state (or, 
presumably, in a foreign jurisdiction).328 In his view, “[t]he Court [in 
 
 325. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 1421, 1477 (2012). 
 326. But see John Culhane, The Most Ingenious Attack on Gay Marriage Bans, DENVER POST 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_24225439/most-ingenious-attack-gay 
-marriage-bans (arguing that while a ruling requiring interstate recognition of a same-sex couple’s 
marriage differs from a ruling requiring states to let same-sex couples marry, “that will soon 
become a distinction without a difference” because same-sex couples will be able to get married 
in hospitable states and then have their marriage recognized in their domicile state). Culhane’s 
op-ed, necessarily limited in length, does not address whether a ruling requiring interstate 
recognition would apply to what conflict of laws doctrine has termed “evasive” marriages, where 
domiciliaries leave a state to marry in another specifically to avoid the restrictions on marriage in 
the state of domicile. 
 327. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 328. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). Cf. Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 2523, 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:H.R.2523: (“For the purposes of 
any Federal law in which marital status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married if 
that individual’s marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered into or, in the case 
of a marriage entered into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in the place where entered 
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Windsor] does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does 
not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of 
their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’ 
may continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage.”329 
In contrast, Justice Scalia dismissed the Windsor majority’s 
express limitation as a “bald, unreasoned disclaimer.”330 In his view, 
it was “easy . . . indeed . . . inevitable” that a majority on the 
Supreme Court would in the future conclude that not only was 
DOMA section 3 “motivated by [a] bare desire to harm” same-sex 
couples, but so too were “state laws denying same-sex couples 
marital status.”331 Scalia entertainingly, and perhaps helpfully from 
the perspective of supporters of marriage equality, provided redlining 
to show the modest changes to the majority opinion (in some cases, 
nonchange) that would demonstrate the applicability of its reasoning 
to the question whether state refusal to let same-sex couples marry 
civilly violates the Equal Protection Clause.332 While Scalia thought 
that state and lower federal courts could distinguish Windsor when 
confronted with such constitutional claims,333 he was confident that 
the Supreme Court would not distinguish it, but rather would extend 
it: “As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is 
just a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe [to drop].”334 
If the other shoe drops in the future, as Justice Scalia put it,335 
 
into and the marriage could have been entered into in a State.”); S. 1236, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 329. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 2692). 
 330. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice 
Roberts specifically rejected this characterization, maintaining that “the disclaimer is a logical 
and necessary consequence of the argument the majority has chosen to adopt.” Id. at 2697 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 331. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 332. Id. at 2709–10. 
 333. Id. at 2709. 
 334. Id. at 2710. 
 335. The district court in Obergefell believed that “‘the state-law shoe’ has now dropped,” 
Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) 
(quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), because of the case before it 
concerning whether the Equal Protection Clause constitutionally compelled Ohio to recognize a 
same-sex couple’s marriage entered in Maryland. Because Obergefell does not in terms require 
Ohio to abandon the mixed-sex requirement for marriage licenses it issues, Justice Scalia might 
only consider it part of a shoe (laces, perhaps?), but the district court’s invocation of Scalia’s 
dissenting trope might suggest that all of these variants of marital exclusion or non-recognition—
DOMA, interstate marriage non-recognition, and state laws limiting marriage to different-sex 
couples—implicate fundamentally similar equal protection problems. I thank Doug NeJaime for 
this observation. 
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then perhaps the “federalism noises”336 in the Court’s opinion in 
Windsor ultimately will appear not to have done much constitutional 
work.337 This might be defended as an acceptable form of 
temporizing,338 a way for the Supreme Court to buy time before 
rendering a constitutional decision condemning the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from civil marriage, time during which, if recent 
history is a guide,339 it appears likely that an even larger majority of 
the people of the country will come to support marriage equality. 
This is unlike the Supreme Court’s making up what was and has 
been generally regarded as a lawless rationale for avoiding reaching 
the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans twelve years before 
Loving v. Virginia.340 Here, in contrast, the Court in Windsor 
provided a rationale, persuasive to the majority Justices and to me, 
for why section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. If in a future case 
the Supreme Court relies on equal protection, but without any 
“amorphous federalism” concerns, to strike down state laws 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage, that need not mean that 
the Windsor opinion was disingenuous. It could simply demonstrate 
 
 336. Id. at 2709 (“Lord, an opinion with such scatter-shot rationales as this one (federalism 
noises among them) can be distinguished in many ways.”). 
 337. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7, 149–55 (1980) (arguing that 
immutability, as distinguished from judgments about relevance or invidiousness, ultimately does 
not do much work in equal protection doctrine). 
 338. Cf. Cruz, supra note 118, at 242–43 (suggesting permissibility of potential Supreme 
Court temporizing regarding whether repealing same-sex couples’ existing right to marry under 
California law was necessary for an equal protection violation because “a refusal to prejudge 
cases that might arise in state with different legal histories may well be an understandable impulse 
toward judicial restraint”). 
 339. Gallup Gay Marriage Poll Finds Majority of U.S. Citizens Would Support Nationwide 
Marriage Equality Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/07/31/gallup-gay-marriage-poll-_n_3682884.html. 
 340. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), dismissed for lack of a federal question a 
mandatory appeal from a state court judgment upholding Virginia’s antimiscegenation law after 
the state court was unresponsive to an earlier Supreme Court decision, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 
891 (1955), that called for greater explanation of the state court’s ruling. For description and 
critique of Naim, see David B. Cruz, Naim v. Naim, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 2006), available at http://american-civil-liberties.com/cases/4184-naim-v-naim-
875-e-2nd-749-va-1955-350-us-891-1955-350-us-985-1956.html; Richard Delgado, The Worst 
Supreme Court Case Ever?: Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525 (2012); Marc Spindelman, 
Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 446–53 (2001); Gerald Gunther, The 
Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial 
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (characterizing Supreme Court’s action in 
Naim as based “on procedural grounds that . . . are wholly without basis in the law”). 
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that the unconstitutionality of DOMA and other marriage laws 
discriminating against same-sex couples was overdetermined.341 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In neither Hollingsworth v. Perry nor United States v. Windsor 
did the Supreme Court make any doctrinal splashes. Perry did extend 
Article III standing doctrine to hold that private parties who were not 
agents of the state and suffered no nonideological injury of their own 
lacked standing to take appeals in federal court to defend state laws 
they support, even if they were responsible for qualifying the 
initiative that made the law. The Court’s precedent arguably did not 
squarely dictate an answer to the question whether or not initiative 
sponsors could, without more, be authorized by state law to defend 
their measures and thereby enjoy federal court standing.342 
Therefore, some extension of doctrine was necessary whatever way 
the Court was going to rule. But Perry’s holding will have limited 
impact. Windsor did hold a federal statute unconstitutional because it 
denied lawfully married same-sex couples equal protection, but it did 
not resolve the question of what tier of equal protection scrutiny 
applies to sexual orientation discrimination, a basic doctrinal 
question that the Court has left open since its first opinion addressing 
lesbigay people’s equal protection rights almost two decades earlier 
in Romer v. Evans.343 Nor did Windsor reach the question whether 
the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to same-sex 
couples. For these reasons, it could appear to be a modest case. 
Yet, we should bear in mind Justice Souter’s admonition that 
“[n]ot every epochal case has come in epochal trappings.”344 The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the marriage cases of its October 2012 
term paved the way for the restoration of same-sex couple’s freedom 
 
 341. Accord Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and Justice Scalia’s Intemperate Dissent, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-and-justice 
-scalias-intemperate-dissent/ (concluding that, given Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the 
Court’s decision in Windsor “if anything, . . . was over-determined, given the added federalism 
spin that propelled it”). 
 342. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Prop 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-initiatives 
-20130628 (opining that Perry standing holding “was clearly right as a matter of constitutional 
law”). 
 343. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 344. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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to marry in the nation’s most populous state, California, home to 
almost one in eight people in the United States. Windsor also 
certainly contributed to the swelling wave of marriage equality 
litigation across the land, something unfolding at a pace almost too 
fast to keep up with: at least eighty-five lawsuits have been filed in 
thirty-two states and Puerto Rico.345 Though looking increasingly 
likely, the advent of nationwide marriage equality might not be as 
inevitable as Justice Scalia’s suggestion that “it is just a matter of 
listening and waiting”346 for “the second, state-law shoe to be 
dropped later, maybe next Term.”347 But with the Windsor and Perry 
decisions, in conjunction with the growing support among the 
populace for same-sex couples’ right to marry,348 the Supreme Court 











 345. See, e.g., Pending Marriage Equality Cases, Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org 
/pending-marriage-equality-cases (last updated Aug. 1, 2014) (“In summary, there currently are 
85 pending lawsuits … involving how the marriage laws of 32 states and Puerto Rico apply to 
same-sex couples. (The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.) All states that do not 
currently allow same-sex couples to marry currently have pending lawsuits challenging that ban, 
or the refusal of the state to recognize marriages same-sex couples entered outside the 
jurisdiction, or both.”); id. (“Marriage equality now exists in the District of Columbia and the 
following 19 states: CA, CT, DE, HI, IA, IL, MA, MD, ME, MN, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, RI, 
VT and WA.”). 
 346. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 347. Id. at 2705. 
 348. See, e.g., Gallup Gay Marriage Poll Finds Majority of U.S. Citizens Would Support 
Nationwide Marriage Equality Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/gallup-gay-marriage-poll-_n_3682884.html 
(describing several nationwide polls showing majority support for same-sex couples’ equal 
freedom to marry). 
